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Abstract 
Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theories 
By 
Jihwan Yu 
 
Advisor: Dr. Steven Cahn 
Abstract: In this essay, I argue for the existence of moral 
dilemmas and draw out the implications of their existence on 
major moral theories. A moral dilemma arises when: a moral agent 
holds moral principles entailing inconsistent actions, the moral 
principles do not override each other, and the moral agent 
cannot perform all the actions entailed by moral principles at 
the same time. In the debates about moral dilemmas, several 
arguments have been advanced in favor of their existence. Among 
them are the argument from moral residue, the argument from a 
plurality of values, and the argument from symmetry. I defend 
these arguments by considering objections to them and offering 
replies to those objections. Several arguments, on the other 
hand, have also been made against the existence of moral 
dilemmas. Among them are the argument from the distinction 
between prima facie and actual duties, the argument from 
exceptions, and the argument from intentions, the argument from 
the non-action-guiding evaluations, and the argument from the 
distinction between negative and positive moral principles. I 
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raise objections to these arguments in order to refute them. 
Having argued for the existence of moral dilemmas, I draw out 
the implications of their existence on major moral theories. The 
existence of moral dilemmas is inconsistent with Kant’s ethical 
theory. According to Kant, it is incoherent to suppose that two 
actions could both be necessary when doing one prevents doing 
the other. If a moral agent has a duty to perform a certain 
action, then the moral agent cannot also have a duty to perform 
another action incompatible with it. The existence of moral 
dilemmas, however, is consistent with Mill’s utilitarianism and 
virtue ethics. Mill’s utilitarianism allows for a situation 
where the alternative courses of action produce the same amount 
of utilities. In such a situation, Mill’s utilitarianism does 
not guide a moral agent as to which action to take. The same 
situation can happen with virtue ethics. Virtue ethics tells a 
moral agent to do what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do in the circumstances. Yet even a fully 
virtuous person may face a situation where he or she cannot tell 
which course of action is the right one. The existence of moral 
dilemmas, however, favors virtue ethics over other moral 
theories, for it provides a better account of moral residue – 
the feelings of remorse or guilt a moral agent experiences after 
violating one of the conflicting moral principles. Virtue ethics 
accounts for moral residue in terms of the emotional response 
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that the virtuous person exhibits. A person that shows no 
emotional response or feels merely regret about violating a 
moral principle exhibits a morally callous character. On the 
other hand, a person with a virtuous character would not only 
take conflicting moral principles seriously but he or she would 
also experience strong negative emotions about violating one of 
them. The kind of emotional response that the moral agent shows 
reveals the type of character that he or she possesses. 
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Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theories 
 
Chapter 1. Definition of a Moral Dilemma 
In this essay, I argue for the existence of moral dilemmas 
and draw out the implications of this argument on major moral 
theories. What, then, is a moral dilemma? And, when does it 
arise? Sartre (1948)’s personal story provides a good 
illustration: 
 
I will refer to the case of a pupil of mine who sought 
me out in the following circumstances. His father was 
quarrelling with his mother and was also inclined to 
be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed 
in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, 
with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, 
burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with 
him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his 
father and by the death of her oldest son, and her one 
consolation was in this young man. But he, at this 
moment, had the choice between going to England to 
join the Free French Forces or of staying near his 
mother and helping her to live. He fully realized that 
this woman lived only for him and that his 
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disappearance — or perhaps death — would plunge her 
into despair. He also realized that, concretely and in 
fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf 
would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to 
live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight 
would be an ambitious action which might vanish like 
water into sand and serve no purpose. For instance, to 
set out for England he would have to wait indefinitely 
in a Spanish camp on the way through Spain; or, on 
arriving in England or in Algiers he might be put into 
an office to fill up forms. Consequently, he found 
himself confronted by two very different modes of 
action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed 
towards only one individual; the other an action 
addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national 
collectivity, but for that reason ambiguous and it 
might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he 
was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the 
one side, the morality of sympathy, or personal 
devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider 
scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose 
between these two. (pp. 35-36)  
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In this story, the student is obligated to stay with his mother, 
since she depends on him for her own happiness. One the other 
hand, he feels obligated to join the Free French in England — 
this is his duty as a citizen to his country. He thus has 
conflicting obligations and is emotionally torn between them. 
One obligation has a limited scope but certain efficacy: 
personal devotion to his mother. The other has much wider scope 
but uncertain efficacy: contribution to defeating an unjust 
aggressor.   
 Does the student face a moral dilemma? The standard 
definition of a moral dilemma is a situation where a moral agent 
is morally obligated to take each of two actions. The agent can 
perform each action, but cannot perform both at the same time. 
This definition, however, is imprecise and requires refinement. 
First of all, the meaning of the term “ought” is unclear and 
ambiguous.
1
 Consider the various uses of “ought”: 
 
(1) You ought to keep your promises. 
(2) You ought not to lie.  
(3) You ought to save money now for the future. 
(4) You ought to get 5 if you add 2 and 3 
(5) The airplane ought to arrive soon. 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of different meanings of the term “ought,” see Sinnott-
Armstrong (1988), pp. 6-8. 
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These examples show the various ways that the term “ought” is 
used. Despite this variety, all these uses share something in 
common: they all indicate some type of reason. One that utters 
sentences (1) and (2) claims that you have a moral reason to 
keep your promise and not to lie. A person who utters sentence 
(3) indicates that you have a prudential reason to save money. 
On the other hand, one that utters sentence (4) indicates that 
you have an epistemic reason to believe that adding 2 and 3 
produces 3. Similarly, one that utters sentence (5) claims that 
you have an epistemic reason to believe that the airplane will 
arrive soon. The term “ought” thus has different meanings 
depending on the particular context. In the context of moral 
dilemmas, the relevant meaning is a moral reason. Thus, when one 
says that an agent is in a moral dilemma where he or she ought 
to take one of two actions, what one means is that the agent has 
a moral reason to take each action.  
 But what is a moral reason? The philosophers engaged in the 
moral dilemma debates differ on what defines a moral reason. One 
of these philosophers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1988), uses the 
term “moral requirement” to qualify a moral reason. According to 
him, a moral reason to take an action comprises a moral 
requirement if and only if it would be morally wrong not to take 
that action, and if no moral justification existed for not 
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taking it. In other words, a moral requirement to take an action 
exists if and only if it would be morally wrong not to take that 
same action in a similar situation. Specifically, the similar 
situation is identical to the actual situation in all relevant 
respects except that while there is a moral justification for 
not taking it in the actual situation, there is no moral 
justification for not taking it in the similar situation. For 
example, a moral reason to keep a promise is a moral requirement 
because failure to keep a promise is a morally wrong unless it 
can be morally justified.  
Conversely, a moral reason for not taking an action 
comprises a moral requirement if and only if taking the action 
would be morally wrong in a situation that is identical to the 
actual one, except for the lack of moral justification for 
taking that action. For example, a moral reason not to kill 
comprises a moral requirement because killing is morally wrong 
unless it is morally justified.  
On the other hand, Christopher Gowans (1996) uses the term 
“moral responsibility” to describe a moral reason. One typically 
finds moral responsibilities in one’s concrete and intimate 
relationships — especially those of kinship, friendship, and 
love. These responsibilities are rooted in two kinds of 
considerations: the first is the perception that the persons in 
each of these relationships is intrinsically and irreplaceably 
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valuable, and the second is the recognition of the connections 
obtained between oneself and these intimates.
2
  
Gowans states that to say that persons are intrinsically 
valuable means that they are valuable beyond any instrumental 
value as a means to some valued end. The idea that persons are 
valuable in and of themselves is a common one in moral 
philosophy. It relates, for instance, to Kant’s notion of 
respecting persons as ends in themselves. On the other hand, a 
less familiar notion is that persons, taken individually, are 
irreplaceably valuable. The common assumption that equality is 
the supreme moral value has obscured the importance of the 
irreplaceable value of persons, since equality seems to imply 
fungibility. As a result, there has not been much discussion of 
this idea among contemporary moral philosophers. On this view, 
each person is not only intrinsically valuable but has a value 
that cannot be fully replaced by the value of another person.  
Attributing intrinsic and irreparable value to a person 
creates the potentiality for one’s responsibility toward them: 
it establishes a person as being for whom one can have moral 
                                                          
2 H. E. Mason (1996) uses a similar expression. He says that moral dilemmas 
often occur at the intersection of overlapping spheres of responsibility: 
family responsibilities, professional responsibilities, civic and public 
responsibilities, and so on. He says these responsibilities tend to 
illustrate both the complexity and diversity of moral considerations 
affecting moral choices. The independence and relative autonomy of the 
various responsibilities provide reason for regarding moral conflict as a 
fact of life.  
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responsibilities. These responsibilities are contingent on 
connections established between persons—family relation, 
friendship, love, nationality, ethnicity, agreement, and the 
like. Relationships among persons are formed on the basis of 
these various connections, and are typically characterized by a 
mutual understanding of moral responsibility. 
While moral responsibilities are typically located in one’s 
intimate relationships with other people, they also apply to 
other contexts. Responsibilities may be based on relationships 
of less endurance and depth. At the outer limit, 
responsibilities may exist among strangers, so long as there is 
some kind of connection among them, even if that of a momentary 
encounter. Furthermore, there may be responsibilities to social 
entities that consist of individual persons brought together 
through common interest, purpose, belief, and the like. One’s 
relationships with social entities play an important part in 
human life. Though different in many respects from relationships 
with individual persons, these relationships can inspire their 
own forms of intimacy and passion.  
 In this essay, I will not use “moral requirement” or “moral 
responsibility” to describe a moral reason. Instead, I will use 
the term “moral principle.” The use of this term, which has a 
general and more neutral meaning, will make it easier to draw 
out the implications of moral dilemmas for different moral 
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theories. Thus, in a moral dilemma, an agent experiences demands 
from two moral principles: one moral principle entails one 
action and the other moral principle entails an inconsistent 
action. The moral principles prompt the agent to perform both 
actions and yet he or she cannot perform both. Therefore, no 
matter which of two inconsistent actions the agent takes, he or 
she is condemned to moral failure because he or she must violate 
one of the moral principles.  
 Typically, it is a physical constraint that prevents the 
agent from performing both actions. Suppose that a moral agent 
experiences the following dilemma: he or she ought to help out a 
person in danger and also to keep his or her promise to meet 
someone. The moral agent wants to perform both obligations. He 
or she cannot do so, however, because it is physically 
impossible for him or her to do so at the same time. In a moral 
dilemma, a moral agent is assumed to be informed and competent. 
It is assumed that a moral agent is fully informed about the 
morally salient features of the situation in which he or she is 
to act. A moral agent is also presumed to be aware of the 
relevant moral obligations imposed on him or her.   
In Sartre’s story, one might describe the moral principles 
influencing the student as the “moral principle of filial piety” 
and the “moral principle of patriotism.” The student believes in 
these principles, yet he is bound to violate one of them. The 
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student cannot perform both actions because a physical feature 
of the world prevents him from doing so: it is physically 
impossible for the student to stay with his mother and join the 
Free French in England at the same time. Perhaps in some other 
possible world with different physical arrangements, the student 
can perform both actions; but in the actual world, he cannot.  
  The standard definition of a moral dilemma, however, is 
deficient in another way: a moral dilemma arises only when 
neither moral principle overrides the other. In Book I of 
Plato’s Republic, Cephalus defines justice as speaking the truth 
and paying one’s debts. Socrates challenges this definition by 
suggesting that it would be wrong to repay certain debts. For 
example, it would be wrong to return a borrowed weapon to a 
friend who is not in his right mind. Socrates’ point is not that 
repaying debts is immoral but that it is not morally right to 
repay one’s debts in every situation. In this case, the two 
moral principles prescribing inconsistent actions are the moral 
principle of repaying one’s debts and the moral principle of 
protecting others from harm. The two moral principles, however, 
are not equal in strength; the principle of protecting others 
from harm seems, most people would agree, stronger than the 
principle of repaying debts. This case, therefore, would not 
count as a moral dilemma.  
  There are cases, however, where two moral principles do not 
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override each other. Sinnott-Armstrong (1996) provides an 
example: a group of people wants to hold a protest in a small 
town, and the town clerk must decide whether to issue a permit. 
It would be morally wrong for the clerk to refuse to issue the 
permit without a good reason to refuse. It would be also morally 
wrong, however, for the clerk to allow the protest to create a 
clear and present danger in the town. Which moral principle 
overrides in this case? According to Sinnott-Armstrong, the 
answer depends on the degree of danger posed. The moral 
principle to allow the permit overrides when the danger to the 
town is small. But, if the danger is clear, present, and large 
enough, the moral principle not to allow it overrides. While 
different people may disagree about how much danger is needed to 
override, everyone would admit that there are times when it 
would be too dangerous to issue the permit. Since each moral 
principle overrides at one end of the danger continuum, there 
must be at least one point in the middle where neither moral 
principle overrides. While it is not clear where the point lies, 
a moral dilemma seems to arise there.
3
  
                                                          
3 Simon Blackburn (1996) says that some moral dilemmas (or quandaries, as he 
calls them) have “inertia.” One can still be in a dilemma even if some fact 
came along to favor one side. As an example, if one is torn between marrying 
A and B, it does not help one make a choice if one’s parents say they will 
throw in a holiday in Martinique if one chooses to marry A. The amount of 
inertia in a dilemma will affect the difficulty of solving it: although there 
may be practical strategies for finding some asymmetry to help A against B, 
it may be difficult to find a sufficiently significant asymmetry. 
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  Most defenders of moral dilemmas agree that a moral dilemma 
is a situation where neither moral principle overrides the other. 
Thomas Nagel (1987) defines moral dilemmas as situations in 
which “there is decisive support for two or more incompatible 
courses of action or inaction . . . since either choice will 
mean acting against some reasons without being able to claim 
that they are outweighed” (p. 175). Similarly, Bas van Fraassen 
(1987) defines a moral dilemma as “a conflict between what ought 
to be for one reason and what ought to be for another reason, 
which cannot be resolved in terms of one reason overriding 
another” (p. 141). Also, Bernard Williams (1987) deems a moral 
conflict tragic when “an agent can justifiably think that 
whatever he does will be wrong: that there are conflicting moral 
requirements, and that neither of them succeeds in overriding or 
outweighing the other” (p. 134).  
  The discussion thus far enables me to provide a formal 
definition of a moral dilemma. A moral dilemma is a situation 
where  
 
(1) An agent holds moral principles entailing inconsistent 
actions, 
(2) The moral principles do not override each other in any 
morally relevant way, 
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(3) The agent cannot perform all the actions entailed by 
moral principles at the same time, 
(4) The agent can perform each action.  
 
Chapter 2. Types of Moral Dilemmas 
   One can draw distinctions among various types of moral 
dilemmas. One distinction is between single-principle moral 
dilemmas and multi-principles moral dilemmas. It has been said 
that a moral dilemma arises when two moral principles do not 
override each other, the story of Sartre’s student being the 
prime example. One can easily imagine, however, moral dilemmas 
arising under multiple moral principles. For example, a moral 
agent can face incompatible actions prescribed by the moral 
principle of promise-keeping, the moral principle of helping out 
others in need, and the moral principle of loyalty to one’s 
friends. And yet, these moral principles can be comparable in 
strength so that none is overridden by another.  
  Yet moral dilemmas can also arise under a single moral 
principle. One can find the most widely discussed example in 
William Styron (1980)’s Sophie’s Choice. Sophie and her two 
children are imprisoned at a Nazi concentration camp. A guard 
tells Sophie that one of her children will be allowed to live 
and the other killed and that she must decide which child will 
die. The guard makes the situation more difficult by telling 
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Sophie that if she chooses neither, both will be killed. For 
each child, Sophie apparently has an equally strong reason to 
save him or her. In this case, the single moral principle of 
saving a child’s life gives rise to inconsistent actions.   
  Another distinction is between single-agent moral dilemmas 
and interpersonal moral dilemmas.
4
 Single-agent moral dilemmas 
arise when a moral agent faces incompatible actions demanded by 
moral principles that he or she upholds. Interpersonal moral 
dilemmas, on the other hand, arise when multiple moral agents 
face mutually incompatible actions prescribed by moral 
principles. For example, a situation may exist where one moral 
agent ought to do a certain act and the other moral agent ought 
to do a different and incompatible act. Though each moral agent 
can perform his or her duty, it is impossible for them to do so 
at the same time.  
   Marcus (1987) describes the distinction between single-
agent moral dilemmas and interpersonal moral dilemmas in the 
following way: 
  
In the one-person case there are principles in 
accordance with which one ought to do x and one ought 
to do y, where doing y requires that one refrain from 
                                                          
4 For a detailed discussion of interpersonal moral dilemmas, see McConnell 
(1988).  
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doing x; i.e., one ought to do not-x. For the present 
rough-grained discussion, the one-person case may be 
seen as an instance of the n-person case under the 
assumption of shared principles. (p. 189) 
 
Antigone, a Greek tragedy, provides an example of interpersonal 
moral dilemmas. Antigone is a daughter of the incestuous 
marriage between King Oedipus of Thebes and his mother, Jocasta. 
After Oedipus’ death, it was decided that the two brothers, 
Eteocles and Polynices, are to reign over Thebes by taking turns. 
Eteocles, however, does not want to give away his power, 
provoking Polynices to leave Thebes to set up an army. In the 
fight for the throne of Thebes, the two brothers kill each other. 
Afterwards, Creon, the new ruler of Thebes, declares that as 
punishment, Polynices’ body must be left on the plain outside 
the city to rot and be eaten by animals. Antigone feels that 
this law is unjust and immoral, and is determined to bury her 
brother in accordance with her familial obligation. After 
Antigone buries her brother, Creon’s guards discover her actions 
and capture her. When Antigone is brought before Creon, she says 
that she was aware of Creon’s law but chose to break it. In this 
story, two moral agents face incompatible obligations. 
Antigone’s familial obligation to bury her brother conflicts 
with Creon’s obligation to uphold the law.  
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  In this essay, I focus on single-agent moral dilemmas. An 
interpersonal moral dilemma involves a compound act involving 
multiple moral agents, making moral evaluation of the action 
more complex. Unlike with an individual act chosen by a single 
agent, it is more difficult to determine whether a compound act 
involving multiple agents is morally right or wrong. Holly Smith 
(1986) supports this point. In discussing what entities possess 
the property of rightness, she says that natural events, such as 
rainstorms or late frosts, cannot be said to be right or wrong. 
They may be said to be good or bad. The reason is that these 
entities are not voluntary — they are not the objects of 
effective choice. Although goodness can apply to entities that 
are not controlled by choices, rightness is reserved for acts 
controlled by voluntary agents. Smith says that built into the 
concept of rightness is that rightness applies only to entities 
about which decisions can be made.  
 Smith says, however, that not all acts can be said to be 
right; rightness can be possessed only by entitles controlled by 
a single agent. For example, although my act of returning your 
lost wallet is right and your act of thanking me is right, the 
compound act of my-returning-your-wallet-and-your-thanking-me 
cannot be right. The reason is that one cannot identify a single 
voluntary agent who could decide to do this act. Following 
Smith’s reasoning, I ignore interpersonal moral dilemmas in this 
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essay.  
   Finally, another distinction is made between self-imposed 
moral dilemmas and dilemmas imposed by the world. Conflicts of 
the former kind arise because of a moral agent's own wrongdoing 
or fault. For example, if an agent makes two promises that he or 
she knew conflict, then through his or her own actions the moral 
agent creates a situation in which he or she is unable to 
perform both requirements. The moral agent is responsible for 
creating the moral dilemma that he or she now faces. Dilemmas 
imposed by the world, on the other hand, arise without a moral 
agent’s fault. Rather, the moral agent is forced into a 
situation of moral conflict. The cases of Sartre's student and 
Sophie's Choice serve as examples.   
  St. Thomas Aquinas adopts this distinction. He provides an 
example in which a priest wrongfully brings a cure of souls. The 
priest is morally obligated not to exercise this authority but 
is also obligated not to desert his flock. Yet, he cannot 
fulfill both obligations. A moral dilemma thus arises from his 
prior wrongdoing. Aquinas admits that situations like this are 
possible, but claims that they do not show any fault with a 
moral system. He says that if the moral agent faces a moral 
dilemma as a result of violating a moral obligation, the moral 
dilemma is the product of the moral agent’s fault, and thus the 
moral theory need not provide guidance for what to do in the 
 
 
17 
 
situation.  
 In this essay, I ignore the distinction between self-
imposed moral dilemmas and dilemmas imposed by the world. A 
moral theory should tell a moral agent what he or she ought to 
do; this is one of the main functions of a moral theory (this 
idea is to be discussed in the next chapter). The moral agent in 
a self-imposed moral dilemma still has to make a decision 
between incompatible actions, and it does not make his or her 
decision any easier for someone to point out that the moral 
agent is at fault. As Thomas Hill (1996) puts it, “morality 
acknowledges that human beings are imperfect and often guilty, 
but it calls upon each at every new moment of moral deliberation 
to decide conscientiously and to act rightly from that point on” 
(p. 176). An average moral agent has an imperfect character and 
frequently commits wrongs. Given the prevalence of the moral 
agent’s wrongdoing, if a moral theory does not provide guidance 
when the moral agent is at fault, the moral theory does not seem 
to be effectively performing one of its main functions.
5
  
 
                                                          
5  Patricia Greenspan (1983) makes another distinction between exclusive 
requirements and exhaustive prohibitions. An example of the former is a 
doctor having to choose one of two patients to treat, in time to avoid losing 
both. The doctor’s choice is directed towards something he is obligated to do. 
On the other hand, the latter case occurs when a moral agent is at fault for 
what he or she does since all the options are ruled out rather than favored 
by the moral code. In this essay, I do not distinguish between these two 
cases.  
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Chapter 3. Philosophical Significance of Moral Dilemmas 
  What philosophical significance do moral dilemmas pose? 
Why should ethicists care about moral dilemmas? If an ethical 
theory allowed moral dilemmas, what problems would emerge? 
According to Terrance McConnell (2014), if a moral theory allows 
moral dilemmas, the trouble is that it fails to be uniquely 
action-guiding. A moral theory can fail to be uniquely action-
guiding in two ways: by not recommending any action in a 
situation or by recommending incompatible actions. According to 
McConnell, one of the functions of a moral theory is providing 
guidance to a moral agent regarding how to act in a given 
situation. The existence of moral dilemmas thus indicates a 
moral theory’s failure to perform one of its main functions. 
   Mark Timmons (2002) says that a moral theory has two main 
functions. A moral theory has the practical function of 
providing a decision procedure for making correct moral 
judgments. A moral theory also has the theoretical function of 
providing moral criteria that explain the underlying nature of 
morality. As to the second function, Timmons says that a moral 
theory should feature principles that explain our moral specific 
considered moral beliefs, thus helping us understand why 
actions, persons, and other objects of moral evaluation are 
right or wrong, good or bad, possessing or lacking moral worth. 
Thus, Timmons would probably agree with McConnell that if a 
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moral theory is not action-guiding, it fails to perform one of 
its main functions.  
  Sinnott-Armstrong (1996), however, appears to hold a 
different view. He asserts that a moral theory that allows moral 
dilemmas can be complete in a different way: it can capture 
moral truth. Such a moral theory can still speak to when one has 
moral obligations, when those obligations conflict, and when 
those conflicts are resolvable. Of course, no moral theory could 
in practice capture every moral truth. A moral theory’s failure 
to resolve some conflicts, however, does not negate its ability 
to render any true moral judgment. In fact, a moral theory would 
reveal a flaw if it did resolve every conflict: when moral 
principles are symmetrical or incomparable, neither is 
overriding. So a moral theory that favors one of the moral 
principles would fail to capture the truth about the relative 
strength of the conflicting moral principles.  
   Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that even though a moral theory 
fails to be action-guiding, a moral theory can be complete as 
long as it captures moral truths. His view, however, is 
vulnerable to the complaint that a moral theory that fails to 
tell a moral agent how to act is impractical. One could ask what 
practical use a moral theory has in our lives if it is not 
action-guiding. One of the appeals of ethics is that it answers 
the questions such as what kind of life one ought to live. The 
 
 
20 
 
kind of life one leads is largely determined by the actions that 
he or she takes. If a moral theory fails to tell a moral agent 
how to act, it is left with a theoretical role of assessing 
whether particular moral beliefs are correct; this is the second 
function of a moral theory, according to Timmons.  
 I believe, however, that a moral theory’s ability to 
perform its action-guiding function comes in degrees. Moral life 
is complex and unpredictable, and it, a moral agent constantly 
faces different moral principles. As a result, as I will later 
argue, moral dilemmas exist where moral principles do not 
override each other. In these cases, a moral theory is unable to 
tell a moral agent what to do. A moral theory, however, should 
not be considered defective for this reason alone. By not being 
action-guiding, a moral theory may be reflecting the complexity 
and unpredictability of moral life. On the other hand, if a 
moral theory allows moral dilemmas on too many occasions, it is 
vulnerable to the objection that it is not practical. In order 
to perform its practical function, a moral theory should be 
action-guiding at least more often than not.   
 Erin Taylor (2013) supports this view. According to her, a 
moral theory should give correct guidance to action. This is one 
of its principal functions. Although a moral theory may not be 
able to eliminate moral dilemmas, it should not allow them too 
often. Taylor says that one should reject a moral theory that 
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fails to guide action too often in favor of one that does not: 
the fewer moral dilemmas a moral theory allows, the better it 
is, all things equal.  
 According to Taylor, a moral theory that allows moral 
dilemmas should not be rejected automatically. A moral theory 
must be sensitive to both human nature and the general 
conditions of human life. A correct moral theory should generate 
duties that take into consideration morally relevant features of 
human life. Where these features are sufficiently important, 
moral duties should track them. For these duties, the existence 
of moral dilemmas in certain unusual circumstances is not a 
sufficient reason to reject the moral theory.  
 
Chapter 4. Ruth Marcus’ View of Inconsistency 
 According to the definition of a moral dilemma discussed 
earlier, a moral dilemma arises when an agent holds moral 
principles entailing inconsistent actions. Inconsistent actions 
are those that the agent cannot take at the same time. Ruth 
Marcus (1987), however, offers a different notion of 
inconsistency. She says that for a set of meaningful sentences 
or propositions, consistency is a property that the set has if 
it is possible for all of the members of the set to be true. In 
other words, a set is consistent if contradiction would not be a 
logical consequence of supposing that each member of the set is 
 
 
22 
 
true. Thus, ‘grass is white’ and ‘snow is green’ compose a 
consistent set even though they are false in this world. A 
possible world exists in which these sentences are true. 
Similarly, one can define a set of moral principles as 
consistent if some possible world exists in which a moral agent 
can obey all of them. According to Marcus’ reasoning, a moral 
dilemma exists only if there is no possible world in which a 
moral agent can obey all the relevant moral principles. A 
situation where a moral agent holds moral principles that he or 
she cannot perform at the same time in this world may not count 
as a moral dilemma.  
  As an illustration, Marcus considers a two-person card 
game. In this game, the deck is shuffled and divided equally 
between two players. Players turn up the top cards on each play 
until all the cards are played. There are two rules in this 
game. The first rule is that black cards trump red cards. The 
second rule is that high cards trump lower-valued cards. When no 
rule applies, e.g., in the case of two red deuces, there is 
indifference and the players proceed. When the cards are played 
out, the winner is the one with the largest number of wins. 
   Suppose that the players turn up a red ace and a black 
deuce. Who trumps? This is not a case of rule indifference, as 
with a pair of red deuces. Rather, two rules apply, but both 
cannot be satisfied. It might be tempting to call the rules of 
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the game inconsistent. But, on the proposed definition, the 
rules are consistent because possible circumstances exist where 
the dilemma would not arise. It is possible that the cards are 
so distributed that, when a black card is paired with a red 
card, the black card happens to be of equal or higher value. It 
is true that with sufficient shuffling, the probability of a 
dilemma-free game is very small. But one can imagine a similar 
game where the probability of proceeding to a conclusion without 
a dilemma is greater. In fact, a game might be so complex that 
the probability of its being dilemmatic under any circumstances 
is very small. On the proposed definition, the rules are 
consistent if there is only a possible case where no conflict 
arises.  
  Furthermore, Marcus says that since it is desirable to meet 
as many obligations as possible, one ought to try to minimize 
the possibility of conflicts between them in this world. The 
existence of moral conflicts in this world acts as a motivating 
factor for one to try to bring about the futures in which this 
possibility is minimized. Marcus calls this rule a second-order 
regulative principle, which states that as rational agents with 
some control of our lives and institutions, we ought to conduct 
our lives and arrange institutions so as to minimize 
predicaments of moral conflict.    
  Patricia Marino (2001) supports and develops Marcus’ 
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regulative principle. Consider the case of Sophie’s Choice, 
which has been discussed previously. According to the regulative 
principle, one might say that Sophie should have tried to avoid 
the dilemma and should try to avoid similar dilemmas in the 
future. But it seems strange to think that she could have 
avoided the dilemma. After all, she is powerless at the moment 
of the dilemma, and seems unable as an individual to prevent a 
similar dilemma from arising in the future. 
  Marino says, however, that this implication results from a 
narrow reading of Marcus’ account. The regulative principle does 
not apply to Sophie as an individual. The regulative principle 
says that we should try to arrange our lives and institutions to 
minimize the likelihood of dilemmas arising. According to 
Marino, it is crucial that Marcus’ regulative principle apply to 
us as members of communities. Thus, in the case of Sophie’s 
Choice, we can consider our obligations as post-Holocaust 
citizens. Even if we disagree on precise action, it is 
reasonable to say that we have a moral obligation to try to 
prevent similar events from happening in our community. We hope 
to learn from her story how to behave in the future and try to 
arrange those communities with care.  
  Marcus’ view of moral dilemmas, however, does not 
satisfactorily resolve the issue. Consider Sartre’s student case 
discussed earlier. The student holds two moral principles 
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entailing inconsistent actions. The moral principle of filial 
piety tells him to stay with his mother and the moral principle 
of patriotism tells him to join the Free French in England. It 
is true that in this world, the student cannot satisfy both 
principles. It is also true that in some possible world — for 
example, where Nazis do not invade Europe — the moral principles 
do not entail inconsistent actions. Knowing this fact, however, 
does not help the student make a choice. It does not give any 
comfort for him to know that in some possible world, he does not 
have to face the dilemma. In this respect, Marcus’ regulative 
principle is not helpful, either. It tells us what to do after 
or in anticipation of moral dilemmas. But it does not tell a 
moral agent facing a moral dilemma what to do. For example, it 
does not give Sophie any guidance as to which child to choose. 
It does not help Sophie to know that the future community will 
try to prevent similar dilemmas from happening in the future.  
   As another example, consider the situation of a criminal 
defense attorney. The attorney has an obligation to hold in 
confidence the disclosures that a client makes as well as to 
conduct himself or herself with candor before the court. Law 
requires that the attorney inform the court when his or her 
client commits perjury.
6
 Therefore, a conflict can exist between 
                                                          
6 This example is drawn from Chapter 3 of Freeman (1975). 
 
 
26 
 
the attorney’s obligations to the court and to the client. It is 
true that in some possible world — for example, one in which 
clients never commit perjury — the attorney can always satisfy 
both obligations. This fact, however, does not help the attorney 
to make a choice between the two obligations. 
 What pragmatic difference is there between the inconsistent 
set of rules and a set of rules where there is a likelihood of 
irresolvable dilemma? A set of rules is supposed to guide action. 
If it allows for conflicts without resolution, telling a moral 
agent that he or she ought to do x as well as y even though x 
and y are incompatible, that amounts to saying that he or she 
ought to do x as well as to refrain from doing x. The set of 
rules has failed as a guide. Even if it is not inconsistent, it 
is deficient and requires modification. As such, a critic might 
say that Marcus has made a trivial logical point.  
 Marcus (1996) anticipates this objection and replies to it 
in the following way. Her reply is that the logical point that 
she has made is not trivial; there are dissimilarities between 
games and the conduct of lives. It is part of the canon of the 
games of chance that the cards must be shuffled. The 
distribution of the cards must be left to chance. To stack the 
deck, like loading the dice, is to cheat. But the moral 
principles that one holds, whatever their justification, are not 
justified merely in terms of some canon for games. Granted, they 
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must be guides to action and hence not totally defeasible. But 
consistency is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition 
for a set of moral rules. Moral principles have some ground; one 
adopts moral principles when he or she has reasons to believe 
that they guide him or her. One’s interest is not merely in 
having a playable game, but in doing the right thing. One may 
want to ensure that he or she can act in accordance with each of 
the rules. To that end, one’s alternative is to try to stack the 
deck so that dilemmas do not arise or that the likelihood that 
they do is reduced.  
 Marcus says that given the complexity of lives and the 
imperfection of knowledge, the occasions of dilemma cannot 
always be foreseen or predicted. In playing games where one is 
faced with a conflict of rules, he or she can abandon the game 
or invent new rules. In conducting life, however, one does not 
abandon life and there may be no justification for making new 
rules to fit. One proceeds with choices as best as he or she can.  
  I believe, however, that Marcus’ reply is unsatisfactory. 
There are important similarities between the rules of games and 
moral rules. Marcus says that moral rules have justifications; 
one adopts them when one has reasons to believe that they guide 
him or her to do the right thing. The rules of games have 
justifications as well. One adopts them to have “fun” amongst 
the players. For this reason, they are not completely arbitrary. 
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One does not adopt the rules that are too hard to follow or 
unnecessary for enhancing the fun of the game.  
  Marcus says that when one discovers a conflict of rules 
when playing a game, he or she can abandon the game or invent 
new rules. A similar thing happens with moral rules. When moral 
rules generate moral dilemmas, one takes a different attitude 
toward the moral rules. One may question their validity. One may 
ask whether the moral rules are prima facie rules that admit 
exceptions. One may ask whether one needs secondary rules that 
can resolve dilemmas. One thus makes similar adjustments to the 
fact of moral dilemmas. These are important and relevant 
similarities between the rules of games and of morality. 
Recognizing them weakens the persuasiveness of Marcus’ reply.  
  According to the definition of moral dilemma in this essay, 
a moral dilemma arises when an agent holds moral principles 
entailing inconsistent actions. Based on Marcus’ view, one might 
suggest that even when the moral principles entail inconsistent 
actions, a moral agent does not face a moral dilemma. One might 
say that as long as there is a possible world in which the moral 
agent can fulfill all the moral principles, what he or she faces 
is not a moral dilemma. My reply to Marcus’ view hopefully shows 
that this move to deny the existence of dilemmas is not a 
promising one.  
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Chapter 5. The Arguments for the Existence of Moral Dilemmas 
 In the debates about moral dilemmas, several arguments have 
been advanced in favor of the existence of moral dilemmas. Among 
them are the argument from moral residue, the argument from a 
plurality of values, and the argument from symmetry.
7
 In what 
follows, I will explain each argument, consider objections, and 
offer replies to them.  
 
5.1. The Argument from Moral Residue 
The first argument for the existence of moral dilemmas is 
the argument from moral residue. Moral residues refer to such 
things as remorse, guilt, apologies, and compensation. These 
emotions and acts occur after violating one of the conflicting 
moral principles. I discuss this argument first and in great 
detail because I rely on it to draw out the implications of 
moral dilemmas on major moral theories. The argument is that 
there are some situations where moral residue is justified, and 
that moral residue is justified only when a moral principle is 
violated. So, the argument goes, moral residue indicates that 
                                                          
7  Gowans (1987) says that F. H. Bradley (1927) represents one of the 
philosophers that argue for the existence of moral dilemmas. Bradley’s 
account of moral dilemmas begins with the claim that the Kantian concept of 
duty for duty’s sake is purely formal and without content. As soon as one 
moves from this formal level to particular duties, it becomes clear that the 
collision of duties is quite common. In fact, Bradley says that every act can 
be taken to involve such collision. Although one ordinarily thinks that moral 
laws are inviolable, reflection shows that there are no laws that are not to 
be broken in some circumstance.  
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moral principles can entail inconsistent actions (i.e., moral 
dilemmas exist). 
Christopher Gowans (1996) provides useful background 
information on the argument from moral residue. He distinguishes 
rationalism and experientialism as two types of moral reflection. 
The rationalist is likely to identify with philosophers such as 
Plato and Kant while the experientialist is likely to identify 
with the likes of Aristotle, Montaigne, and Hume. Gowans says 
that the argument from moral residue is an expression of 
experientialism rather than rationalism.  
The rationalist considers moral practice as a form of human 
rationality defined by a prominent tradition in western 
philosophy. In this tradition, reason requires a system and 
order. This tradition requires commensurability and hierarchy, 
insists on the importance of generality and abstraction, and 
demands precise formulation of concepts and principles. Although 
the rationalist seeks to understand moral practice, its paradigm 
of rationality is often found elsewhere. In the Platonic 
tradition, mathematics has served as the ideal case of 
rationality, whereas in the Enlightenment tradition, the natural 
sciences are looked to as the model. The rationalist, seeing 
these types of disciplines as defining human rationality, tries 
to understand moral practice in light of this conception. This 
conception judges the moral life as an exemplification of 
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practical reason, embodying the aforementioned characteristics. 
When actual moral practice does not meet these standards, the 
rationalist argues that it should be corrected by referring to 
those standards.  
As a result of this orientation, the rationalist tends to 
believe that all moral considerations are ultimately based on a 
single and abstract principle, and that any specific action-
guiding moral judgment may be deduced from this principle. On 
the other hand, the rationalist is deeply skeptical about the 
philosophical value of concrete moral experience. It does not 
deny that one’s encounter with particular moral situations — 
whether in personal life, history, or biography — is important. 
But with philosophical reflection, the rationalist is inclined 
to think that these encounters are likely to impede one’s 
understanding; the encounters are encumbered by idiosyncratic 
detail concerning background, context, and personality. Thus, 
one is likely to react to them with extraneous and unpredictable 
emotional responses.  
In contrast, the experientialist attempts to understand 
moral practice from the standpoint of the moral experience of 
persons. The experientialist gives priority to observation and 
reflection on what it is like for a person in a particular 
social context to live life. For the experientialist, what it 
feels like to live a life from the inside — to live a human life 
 
 
32 
 
as a moral agent — is the principal source of comprehending 
moral practice. The experientialist believes that the perception 
of the particularities in actual moral situations is essential 
to moral deliberation. The experientialist also considers one’s 
emotional responses to specific persons as an important source 
of moral knowledge. As a result, the experientialist considers 
history, biography, literature, and the like as a significant 
resource for philosophical analysis.  
The experientialist places primary importance on what it 
finds in moral experience. The experientialist thus typically 
supposes that moral deliberation involves reflection on a 
plurality of diverse and concrete moral considerations, and 
looks as much to the distinctive features of a situation as to 
its generic properties. As a result, the experientialist does 
not agree with the rationalist’s conception of moral 
deliberation as deduction from an abstract first principle.  
Gowans says that the argument from moral residue is an 
expression of experientialism. He maintains that the argument 
describes a concrete situation in which moral considerations 
conflict, and suggests that in such a situation, the person 
involved would feel an emotion such as remorse or guilt no 
matter what was done. The argument from moral residue then 
proposes that this emotional reaction would make sense only if 
the person was in a moral dilemma, and it concludes that there 
 
 
33 
 
indeed are moral dilemmas. Since its underlying assumption is 
that one can learn from reflection on one’s moral experience, 
Gowans argues, the argument derives from experientialism.  
Thomas Hill (1996), however, disagrees with Gowans. In 
particular, Hill says, although Kant may be considered a 
rationalist, his ethics can account for moral residue. Hill 
distinguishes between a hard-line Kantian position and a 
moderate one. The hard-line Kantian insists that only immoral 
choices (or “willings”) are considered objectively bad; 
everything else is considered bad only relative to individual 
tastes and preferences. According to this view, the pains, 
injury, and death of others must be regarded as bad things only 
in the sense that they are things one would normally be wrong to 
choose to bring about. When misfortunes occur naturally, result 
from accidents, or are caused in the performance of duty, the 
hard-line Kantian tries to maintain the attitude, “What is that 
to me?” for he or she sees the misfortunes as not in themselves 
bad and sees no reason to indulge in his or her own empathetic 
suffering when it can do nothing for the victims. 
 According to the hard-line view, a morally good person need 
only be concerned with his or her own acts and motives. His or 
her duties direct him or her to promote certain effects and to 
try not to cause other effects. For example, he or she must try 
to aid the needy and avoid killing innocent people. Perhaps, he 
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or she should have sympathy to offset the selfish inclinations 
that tempt him or her from the path of duty. But apart from such 
concerns, the hard-line Kantian says that a morally good person 
may have an attitude of indifference to the pains, injuries and 
deaths of human beings when these result from natural causes, 
the unpreventable behavior of others, or his or her own dutiful 
acts.  
The hard-line position contrasts with the moderate position. 
The moderate position is based on Kant’s idea that humanity in 
each person is an end in itself. Like other formulations of the 
categorical imperative, Kant’s humanity formula addresses how 
one should act. In explaining the grounds for this action-
guiding principle, however, Kant expresses the broader 
requirement to conceive of humanity in each person as an end in 
itself. The required condition is an evaluative attitude; it 
means regarding each human being as something whose existence is 
of absolute value. To acknowledge this evaluative stance as 
morally appropriate is not something one chooses, but is 
supposed to be inherent in all moral agents. What one is 
required to do and can do, but might fail to do, is to adopt 
this attitude as his or her own overriding commitment. To do so 
is to let the idea of human dignity guide not only one’s actions 
but also one’s judgments about what is good and bad among the 
things not under his or her control. 
 
 
35 
 
Suppose some people have just suffered horrible deaths from 
a natural or accidental disaster. Upon learning it, a person 
with the right moral attitude will do what he or she can to aid 
the victims and to minimize the risk of recurrences. But he or 
she will also regard it a very bad thing that the people 
suffered and died needlessly. This is a judgment that is more 
than a moral wish or personal preference. The right attitude 
leads one immediately to deplore the tragic fate of the victims 
and not merely to focus on one’s own future-oriented tasks. Even 
if the tragedy was utterly beyond human control, the moral 
attitude is reflected in the “will” that it not be so. 
The moderate Kantian can agree with the common opinion that 
one should have concern for those who suffer as a result of how 
he or she acts in a moral dilemma. In deploring these 
misfortunes and tragedies that are not his or her fault, one 
expresses the basic moral attitude that counts each human being 
as having a special value. One may at the same time express 
personal grief and sympathy for the victims, but this goes 
beyond the attitude that can be morally expected of everyone.  
Given this philosophical background on moral residue, 
Bernard Williams (1987) makes a detailed argument from moral 
residue. He attempts to show that moral dilemmas are more like 
“conflicts of desires” than “conflicts of beliefs.” Suppose that 
a man believes that a certain person who took office in October 
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1964 was a prime minister and also that the person was a member 
of the conservative party. The man later learns that no such 
minister was a conservative. If he believes this new information, 
he becomes conscious of the conflict between his original 
beliefs, and that he had held inconsistent beliefs. According to 
Williams, if two consistent beliefs become inconsistent when a 
new belief is added to them, a conflict of beliefs arises. A 
conflict of beliefs arises because of a contingent matter of 
fact — the contingent fact that there was no minister who took 
office in October 1964 was a conservative. 
Consider, however, a different scenario. Suppose that a man 
is both thirsty and lazy. He is seated comfortably in a chair 
but his drinks are situated in the kitchen away from him. He 
desires both to be seated and to quench his thirst. So, there is 
a conflict between his desires. The conflict arises because of a 
contingent matter of fact; the conflict would disappear if 
someone brought a drink to him or he discovered a drink within 
arm’s reach. The conflict of desires and the conflict of beliefs 
thus share a similarity in that they arise from a contingent 
matter of fact, making it impossible for both beliefs to be true 
or both desires to be satisfied.  
 According to Williams, however, there is an important 
difference between conflict of beliefs and conflict of desires. 
Suppose that the conflict has ended: a moral agent has decided 
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that only one of the conflicting beliefs is true or has 
satisfied only one of the desires. The rejected belief cannot 
survive this point because to decide that a belief is false is 
to abandon it. A moral agent no longer holds that belief. The 
case is different with a desire, however. The rejected desire 
can reappear in one form or another. It may reappear, for 
instance, as a desire for a substitute. If no substitute is 
available, the rejected desire may reappear in the form of 
regret for what was missed.  
One might say that the rejected belief also involves regret. 
If one abandons a belief, one may experience regret because it 
was one’s own belief. For example, a scientist may feel regret 
for abandoning his theory. One may also experience regret 
because it would have been better if the world was in fact as he 
or she had believed it was. For example, a father may feel 
regret when he abandons the belief that his son survived a 
sunken ship. Thus, one might say, it is possible to experience 
regret in the loss of a belief. 
The fact that one once held a belief, however, does not 
quite explain the regret that attaches to the abandoned belief. 
A better explanation is that that one had a desire for the 
belief to be true. The fact that a scientist regrets his theory 
turning out to be false suggests that he or she wanted the 
theory to be true. And the desire associated with the theory 
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shows itself in the form of regret. Similarly, the father feels 
regret because he had a desire to believe that his son survived 
the accident.  
Williams argues that moral dilemmas are more like conflicts 
of desires than conflicts of beliefs. In a moral dilemma, when a 
moral agent chooses to act on one moral principle rather than 
the other, he or she does so without necessarily abandoning the 
other moral principle. The other moral principle still 
influences him or her. This fact is supported by the regret that 
the moral agent experiences for what was not done. The moral 
agent feels that he or she has not done something that ought to 
have been done. 
The moral agent’s feeling of regret does not depend on 
whether he or she has acted for the best. Under the 
circumstances, he or she may have made the best possible choice. 
Even if convinced of this fact, he or she may still experience 
regret for what was not done. The moral agent acknowledges the 
presence of both moral principles: he or she acknowledges one 
moral principle by acting on it and the other by feeling regret 
for not acting on it. The experience of regret thus suggests 
that the moral agent was in a moral dilemma.  
Although Williams uses the term “regret” to describe the 
emotional state of a moral agent that has violated a moral 
principle, this term is usually used by the opponents of moral 
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dilemmas. The advocates of moral dilemmas, in contrast, usually 
use terms such as “remorse” or “guilt.”  Marcus (1980) believes 
that “remorse” or “guilt” is the appropriate term to use to 
describe a moral agent’s emotional state.8 Although she proposes 
a different notion of inconsistency, she says that in real life, 
a moral agent can encounter moral principles entailing 
conflicting actions: through no fault of his or her own, he or 
she cannot fulfill both moral principles. As a result, he or she 
may be apologetic for the unfulfilled obligation and may self-
impose reproofs and penalties. Marcus says “regret” is too weak 
to describe the accompanying moral sentiment. Something closer 
to “remorse” or “guilt” is more appropriate.9  
I agree with Williams that moral dilemmas are similar to 
conflicts of desires rather than conflicts of beliefs, in this 
                                                          
8 Mark Strasser (1987) holds that regret is the right term to use for a moral 
agent’s emotional experience. But he distinguishes between deserving to feel 
regret and appropriately feeling regret. Some theorists argue that when a 
moral agent has acted rightly by fulfilling his or her overriding obligation, 
he or she should not feel badly for having done so. Other theorists argue 
that because the moral agent has disappointed other people’s expectations, he 
or she should feel badly. If one distinguishes guilt and regret, one can say 
that the moral agent ought not feel guilty for performing a morally correct 
action, but ought to feel regret for disappointing the expectations. Strasser 
says that the moral agent ought to feel regret, not because he or she 
deserves to feel it but because a moral agent with a good character would 
feel it.  
9  Patricia Greenspan (1983) holds a qualified view. She says that a moral 
agent should feel guilt in an exhaustive prohibition case such as Sophie’s 
Choice. In this case, Sophie knows that she is responsible for doing 
something wrong even though she could not have avoided doing wrong. The same 
would be true if she had chosen differently and allowed both children to be 
killed. It would be strangely insensitive for a mother not to experience 
guilt at either choice.  
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respect: both rejected desire and violated moral principle can 
evoke negative emotions in a moral agent. Just as the rejected 
desire can reappear in the form of regret for what was missed, 
the moral principle that a moral agent does not act on can 
reappear in the form of remorse or guilt. The fact that a moral 
agent experiences these negative emotions after violating a 
moral principle suggests that the moral principle still 
influences him or her.
10
  
I believe, however, that the argument from moral residue as 
presented by Williams is not complete. According to the 
definition of a moral dilemma that I have adopted in this essay, 
the competing moral principles must be not overridden. The fact 
that a moral agent would feel remorse or guilt about violating 
each moral principle merely shows that he or she acknowledges 
the presence of both moral principles. To show that a moral 
dilemma exists, however, one must also show that neither moral 
principle overrides the other. To do so, one must show that the 
moral agent would feel the same degree of remorse or guilt no 
                                                          
10 Gowans (1987) says that another issue related to the arguments from moral 
residue is moral realism. Some might say that the existence of moral dilemmas 
is incompatible with moral realism. In one sense of the term, realism is the 
view that the truth-value of a statement is determined by the world, where 
the world is taken to be something independent of human reason, will, and 
desire. Realism in this sense can be said to mean that conflicting statements 
cannot both be true. Williams argues that since conflicting ought statements 
can both be affirmed, as evidenced by regret, moral realism in this sense 
cannot be correct. In this essay, I do not deal with the issue of moral 
realism. Rather, I focus on the issue of whether moral dilemmas exist and the 
implications of their existence on major moral theories.  
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matter which moral principle he or she violated. This would 
suggest that the moral principles influencing the moral agent 
are roughly equal in strength and hence not overriding.   
One can reflect this idea in the moral dilemma that 
Sartre’s student experiences. Using this case, one can describe 
the argument from moral residue as follows: 
 
(1) The moral principle of filial piety entails the student to 
stay with his mother. 
(2) The moral principle of patriotism entails the student to 
join the Free French. 
(3) If the student does not stay with his mother, he 
experiences remorse or guilt. 
(4) It is appropriate that the student experiences these 
emotions. 
(5) If the student does not join the Free French, he 
experiences the same degree of remorse or guilt. 
(6) It is also appropriate that the student experiences these 
emotions. 
(7) Experiencing remorse or guilt is appropriate only when a 
moral agent has violated a moral principle. 
(8) The student cannot stay with his mother and join the Free 
French in England at the same time.   
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(9) The student must violate one of two non-overridden moral 
principles no matter which action he takes. 
(10) The student faces two non-overridden moral principles 
entailing inconsistent actions.  
(11) The student is in a moral dilemma.  
 
Sentence (9) follows from (1) to (8). Sentence (10) follows from 
(9). And sentence (11) follows by definition of a moral dilemma.  
 Terrance McConnell (1996) raises several objections to the 
argument from moral residue, the first being that the argument 
is question-begging. He says that when a moral agent faces a 
situation like that of Sartre’s student, he or she appropriately 
experiences negative emotions. But the negative emotions are not 
limited to remorse or guilt; they include regret. A moral agent 
can appropriately experience regret even when the agent does not 
believe that he or she has violated a moral principle: the moral 
agent can experience regret about a negative state of affairs.  
For example, a parent may appropriately regret that she 
must punish her child even though she believes that her child 
deserves punishment. She appropriately experiences regret 
because she has brought about a bad state of affairs (i.e., the 
child’s discomfort) even though she is morally required to do so. 
Regret can even be appropriate when a moral agent has no causal 
connection with the negative state of affairs. For example, a 
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moral agent can appropriately regret that a recent fire has 
caused damage to the neighbor’s house, that severe birth defects 
have caused pain in infants, that a starving animal experiences 
suffering in the wilderness, and so on.
11
  
According to McConnell, remorse or guilt has two components. 
The first is the experiential component, which is the negative 
feeling that a moral agent experiences. The second is the 
cognitive component, which is the belief that the moral agent 
has done something wrong. McConnell says that one cannot 
distinguish between remorse (or guilt) and regret based solely 
on the experiential component; regret can range from mild to 
intense as can remorse. Instead, one can distinguish them based 
on the cognitive component: regret does not involve a violation 
of a moral principle while remorse or guilt does.
 
 
 When one examines the case of an alleged moral dilemma, 
McConnell argues, it begs the question to claim that a moral 
agent’s experience of remorse or guilt is appropriate, no matter 
what he or she does (i.e., sentences (4) and (6)). While it is 
appropriate for the moral agent to experience some negative 
                                                          
11  Thomas Hill (1996) describes the regret a moral agent experiences after 
injuring someone. He says that the moral agent needs to acknowledge that his 
or her action, although justifiable in the circumstances, puts him or her in 
a special relation to the actual victim. This does not mean that the moral 
agent should feel more regret for harming that individual than he or she 
would have if he or she had injured a different person. The moral agent, 
however, should deplore the fact that he or she injured that very person, not 
just that he or she injured someone.   
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feeling, to describe that feeling as remorse or guilt rather 
than regret is to presuppose that the moral agent believes that 
he or she has done something wrong. In other words, to say that 
the moral agent appropriately feels remorse or guilt is to 
presuppose rather than argue that he or she is in a moral 
dilemma.   
 I believe that McConnell’s objection that the argument from 
moral residue is question-begging is unconvincing. One can 
respond to his objection by providing an independent argument to 
support sentences (4) and (6). Suppose that Sartre’s student has 
decided to join the Free French and leave his mother. Consider 
different responses by the student. Suppose that the student 
says the following: “I have decided to join the Free French for 
a patriotic reason. I think this is the best decision under the 
circumstances. If I leave my mother, she will have to live alone 
and plunge into despair. I do not feel bad about it though, for 
that is the inevitable consequence of my decision. I have made a 
choice to serve my country and I do not have to feel bad about 
my mother.” Most people would say that this is not an 
appropriate response by someone with the minimum moral decency. 
Given his relationship with her and the difficulties that she 
will experience, most people would expect the student to be 
emotionally involved with the situation. They would expect him 
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to experience negative emotions about her mother and to feel 
uncomfortable with leaving her alone.  
 Suppose instead that the student says the following: “I 
regret what will happen to my mother when I leave her to join 
the Free French. She has been deeply saddened by my father’s 
treason and my brother’s death. My disappearance will intensify 
her sadness. Although I regret leaving her, I have to put this 
feeling in perspective. I regret many things about this world. I 
regret, for example, that many buildings have been destroyed 
during the war, that there are hungry people on the streets, and 
that some people have lost their family members. I feel bad 
about this state of affairs. On the other hand, bad things 
happen in life. The fact that I am leaving my mother is one of 
many things that I regret about life.” Most people would say 
that this response is not quite appropriate. There is something 
morally callous about the student’s treating her mother’s 
situation as one example of how the world is in a bad state of 
affairs. Given his mother’s situation, most people would expect 
the student’s response to be more personal and emotional. They 
would expect him to feel sorrier and more sympathetic about her 
mother’s situation.  
 Finally, suppose that the student says the following: “I 
feel remorse or guilt about leaving my mother. I have made a 
very difficult choice. Although I believe I have made a good 
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choice under the circumstances, I am leaving my mother with a 
heavy heart. Even if I join the Free French, I will be worried 
about my mother. I wish things were different and feel very bad 
about what I am about to do. I hope to return from my service 
soon and take care of my mother.” Most people would say that 
this is the appropriate response by the student. They would 
expect the student to feel very bad about leaving his mother. 
Something like remorse or guilt seems to be an emotion that the 
student should feel in the situation.  
The comparison of these cases suggests that remorse or 
guilt is the appropriate emotional response by the student. This 
conclusion obviously relies on the moral intuitions that most 
people have and these may not be as reliable as, say, scientific 
observations. Nonetheless, the comparison helps one to realize 
the inappropriateness of detached emotional responses by the 
student, providing independent support for sentences (4) and 
(6). This reply thus counters McConnell’s objection that the 
argument from moral residue is question-begging.  
McConnell’s second objection is that it is questionable 
whether remorse or guilt is an appropriate emotional response 
only in cases where a moral agent has violated a moral principle 
(i.e., sentence (7)).
12
 He provides an example to support his 
                                                          
12  Philippa Foot (1987) argues that the negative emotions come from bad 
consequences rather than violating moral principles. Take, for example, the 
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claim. Consider the case of a middle-aged man, Bill, and a 
seven-year old boy, Johnny. On a snowy day, Johnny and several 
of his friends are riding their sleds down a narrow and seldom 
used street. The street intersects with a busier street. In his 
enthusiasm for sledding, Johnny neglects to be careful. During 
his final ride, he skids under an automobile that passes through 
the intersection and is killed. Bill is driving the car. He had 
been driving safely, had the right of way, and was not exceeding 
the speed limit. Moreover, it was impossible for Bill to see 
Johnny coming. Therefore, Bill is not responsible for Johnny’s 
death in any way. Yet Bill feels very bad about what happened. 
The emotions that he experiences could be described as remorse 
or guilt.  
 McConnell says that in some sense, Bill’s feelings of 
remorse or guilt are not warranted because he did nothing wrong. 
But most of us would understand Bill’s emotional response. From 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
breaking of a promise. One has promised to meet someone but must instead take 
an accident victim to hospital. Obviously, one regrets it if there is no time 
to let the promisee to know. But this is regret for the bad consequences, not 
regret for the breaking of a promise. To show this, suppose that things turn 
out splendidly. The promisee is not annoyed but meets his or her future 
beloved, or someone offers him or her a good job. One would not then be 
inclined to say that an element of distress should exist because a promise 
has been broken, and that breaking the promise is regrettable. Patricia 
Marino (2001) has a reply to Foot’s point, however. She provides a counter-
example. Suppose a mother is careless and her child wanders off into a pool. 
Instead of drowning, the child learns to swim. The mother may feel joy at her 
child’s accomplishment, but she has reason to regret her negligence. In other 
words, the fact that good fortune saves one from bad consequences does not 
mean that he or she need not feel bad about failing obligations.  
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Bill’s point of view, the response is not inappropriate. To see 
this, imagine that Bill had a very different response. Suppose 
that Bill said, “I regret Johnny’s death. It is a terrible 
thing. But it certainly was not my fault. I have nothing to feel 
guilty about and I don’t owe his parents any apology.” Even if 
Bill is correct intellectually, it is hard to imagine someone 
being able to achieve this level of objectivity about his or her 
behavior. When human beings have caused great harm, they wonder 
if they are at fault, even if to outsiders they bear no moral 
responsibility. This example suggests that there are situations 
where a moral agent’s remorse or guilt is appropriate even 
though he or she has not violated any moral principle.  
 I believe that the McConnell’s example fails to prove his 
point. Even if one grants that the driver has certainly not 
violated any moral principle and that the driver is aware of 
this fact, the driver example forces McConnell to take an 
inconsistent position. As discussed earlier, McConnell says that 
remorse or guilt has two components: the experiential component 
and the cognitive component. According to him, one cannot 
distinguish between remorse (or guilt) and regret based solely 
on the experiential component; regret can range from mild to 
intense, as can remorse. Instead, one can distinguish them based 
on the cognitive component: regret does not involve a violation 
of a moral principle while remorse or guilt does.
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If McConnell’s distinction between regret and remorse (or 
guilt) is correct, then he can only describe the driver’s 
emotions as “intense regret.” If the driver has not violated any 
moral principle, McConnell’s distinction between regret and 
remorse or guilt does not allow him to describe the emotions as 
remorse or guilt. McConnell thus cannot use the driver example 
to support his view without being inconsistent.  
McConnell (1987)’s final objection is that the advocates of 
moral dilemmas cannot adequately explain two phenomena that are 
frequently associated with moral dilemmas. One is that a moral 
agent who apparently faces a moral dilemma frequently seeks 
moral advice. He or she may ask seek advice from a more 
experienced and wise person about how to resolve the dilemma. 
For example, Sartre’s student seeks advice from his teacher 
about what he ought to do in his situation. The second 
phenomenon is that after acting on one of the conflicting moral 
principles, a moral agent often experiences moral doubt. The 
moral agent wonders if he or she has acted on the right moral 
principle — or more typically, if he or she has acted on the 
wrong moral principle. Furthermore, these behaviors of a moral 
agent are considered appropriate. In other words, when a moral 
agent facing moral dilemmas seeks advice and experiences moral 
doubt, most people would regard such behaviors as proper and 
reasonable.  
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McConnell claims that while the opponents of moral dilemmas 
can easily explain this fact, the advocates of moral dilemmas 
cannot. Suppose that a moral agent who is facing conflicting 
obligations asks another person for moral advice. The moral 
agent’s asking for advice indicates that he or she believes that 
there is one action that he or she ought to take. In other words, 
the moral agent believes that one of two moral principles 
overrides the other and hence that the situation he or she is in 
is not a moral dilemma.  
One can make a similar claim about a moral agent’s 
experiencing doubt. Having acted on one of the moral principles, 
the moral agent may worry after about what he or she has done. 
He or she often wonders whether he or she has acted in the right 
way. The doubt occurs because the moral agent assumes that there 
is only one right action to take in the situation and is not 
sure if he or she has taken it. The moral agent’s experiencing 
doubt, therefore, suggests that the moral dilemma does not exist.  
McConnell says that the advocates of moral dilemmas might 
offer a different explanation of a moral agent’s behaviors. In 
order to explain the moral agent’s seeking advice, they might 
make a distinction between a genuine moral dilemma (i.e., a 
situation where moral principles do not override each other) and 
an apparent moral dilemma (i.e., a situation where one moral 
principle overrides the other, though at first glance it does 
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not appear to). If the situation is an apparent moral dilemma, a 
moral agent may seek advice because others may be able to help 
him or her discover what he or she really ought to do. If the 
situation is a genuine dilemma, however, the moral agent may 
seek advice because he or she ought to take all the reasonable 
precautions before acting. He or she, for example, may want to 
make sure that the situation is a genuine dilemma instead of an 
apparent one. The advocates of moral dilemmas can offer a 
similar explanation of the moral agent’s experiencing moral 
doubt. If the situation is an apparent moral dilemma, then there 
is one action that he or she should take. Moral doubt is 
appropriate because the moral agent might have taken the wrong 
action even though he or she tried not to. If the situation is a 
genuine moral dilemma, however, the moral agent cannot help but 
do at least one thing wrong. This creates doubt about the action 
that he or she did choose. 
McConnell responds that the plausibility of this 
explanation depends on whether the advocates of moral dilemmas 
can reasonably distinguish between an apparent moral dilemma and 
a genuine one. He claims, however, that there is no epistemic 
criterion for the distinction between them. At least, as far as 
he knows, the advocates of moral dilemmas have offered no such 
criterion. If there is no epistemic criterion for distinguishing 
between them, the advocates of moral dilemmas are forced to 
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admit that a moral agent’s seeking advice and experiencing doubt 
are always appropriate because it is impossible for him or her 
to tell whether he or she is in an apparent moral dilemma or a 
genuine one. To take this line, however, is to concede that the 
moral agent must treat every case as if it were only an apparent 
moral dilemma. This puts the advocates of moral dilemmas in a 
very weak position. If they admit this much, one may wonder 
whether there are any grounds for ever thinking that one is in a 
genuine moral dilemma. To grant that a moral agent must 
presuppose that each conflict that he or she faces as only an 
apparent moral dilemma is to give the opponents all that they 
need. After all, the opponents of moral dilemmas suggest that a 
moral agent should behave as if genuine moral dilemmas do not 
exist.  
I believe that McConnell’s view is not persuasive. In fact, 
an epistemic criterion exists to distinguish between genuine 
moral dilemmas and apparent ones. To determine whether a 
particular situation is a genuine moral dilemma, a moral agent 
can look to the moral residue that he or she experiences. If the 
moral agent feels the same degree of remorse or guilt regardless 
of which moral principle he or she violates, it provides 
credible evidence that the moral principles do not override each 
other and that the situation is a genuine moral dilemma.  
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When the difference in moral feelings is clear and 
overwhelming, a moral agent probably need not seek advice or 
have doubt. When the difference is not clear, however, the moral 
agent may seek advice in advance or have moral doubt afterwards. 
This behavior does not necessarily imply that the moral agent’s 
feelings are unreliable guides. Rather, it may mean that his or 
her feelings can be subject to error at times. For example, the 
moral agent may have a closer relationship with a particular 
person whom his action will affect; he or she may unwittingly 
ignore the relevant facts surrounding the situation; or he or 
she may have been brought up to favor particular moral 
principles over others. These possibilities provide sufficient 
motivation for the moral agent to seek advice and experience 
moral doubt. Therefore, contrary to McConnell’s reply, the moral 
residue can serve as a reasonable and yet imperfect criterion to 
distinguish between genuine moral dilemmas and apparent ones.  
My view is vulnerable to the objection that a moral agent’s 
emotions are not reliable guides for assessing the strengths of 
moral principles. Emotions can be untrustworthy in different 
ways. For example, a moral agent’s past personal experience can 
affect how he or she feels about the conflicting moral 
principles in a given case. As a result, a moral agent may not 
be able to objectively assess the difference in emotional 
intensity.  
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 This objection provides a reason for me to strengthen the 
general assumptions that I have made about a moral agent. I have 
assumed that a moral agent is informed and competent. A moral 
agent is fully informed about the morally salient features of 
the situation in which he or she is to act. A moral agent is 
also aware of the relevant moral obligations imposed on him or 
her. I need to add other assumptions about a moral agent. He or 
she can objectively assess the emotions involved in conflicting 
moral obligations. He or she can also reasonably distinguish 
these emotions’ degree of intensity.  
These additional assumptions, however, may not be 
sufficient to persuade a committed rationalist. A rationalist 
believes that all moral considerations are ultimately based on a 
single and abstract principle, and that any specific moral 
judgment may be deduced from this principle. For the rationalist, 
emotions may not be morally relevant data suitable for moral 
analysis. In fact, the rationalist would treat the philosophical 
value of a moral agent’s emotions with skepticism. Therefore, 
the persuasiveness of the argument from moral residue may 
ultimately depend on whether one agrees with the rationalist or 
the experientialist. There may not be a satisfying way to 
resolve the issue completely. Hopefully, the next two arguments 
will strengthen the case for the existence of moral dilemmas.  
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5.2. The Argument from Incomparability of Values 
Another argument for the existence of moral dilemmas is the 
argument from incomparability of values. It has been said that a 
moral dilemma arises when a moral agent faces non-overridden 
moral principles. Moral principles do not override each other 
when they are equal in strength. There is a different way, 
however, that moral principles may not override each other. The 
strength of one moral principle may not be greater than, less 
than, or equal to the strength of the other. In other words, 
moral principles may be incomparable with each other. 
E. J. Lemmon (1987) argues for the incomparability of moral 
values. According to him, there are three sources of the moral 
“ought”: duties, obligations, and moral principles. To be 
specific, one ought to do something if it is one’s duty to do 
it; one ought to do it if one is under an obligation to do it; 
and one ought to do it if it is right in view of some moral 
principle.  
One’s duties are closely related to one’s status or 
position. For example, one has duties in virtue of a job: one 
has duties as a policeman, a headmaster, a politician, and so 
on. Family relationships also may determine one’s duties. One 
thus has duties as a father, a mother, a son, or a daughter. 
Lemmon says it is not clear whether there are duties of a host, 
a friend, or a citizen.  
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Obligations, on the other hand, are typically incurred by 
previous committing actions. For example, one has obligations as 
a result of promising or giving one’s word. For example, if one 
swears to tell the truth, then one is under an obligation to do 
so. Lemmon says it is less clear whether one has obligation to 
return hospitality after having received it and whether one has 
an obligation to give money to a beggar after having been asked 
for it. These latter cases represent incurring obligations by 
others’ conduct rather than one’s own.  
The moral principles are the last source of the moral ought. 
For example, one ought to tell the truth because one holds a 
moral principle of truth-telling. One may also know that one 
ought not commit adultery because he or she holds a moral 
principle that one should be faithful in marriage.  
Lemmon says that these sources are independent of one 
another. One can be under an obligation to do something although 
one is not duty-bound to do it, and vice versa. For example, it 
may be that one ought to vote against a communist candidate in 
an election because it is one’s duty as a citizen. One may not, 
however, be under an obligation to vote against the communist 
candidate. On the other hand, if one has given one’s word, one 
may be under the obligation to vote against the communist. 
Furthermore, one may have both an obligation and a duty to do 
the same thing. For example, in the witness stand, it is one’s 
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duty as a witness to tell the truth, and it is one’s obligation 
to tell the truth by swearing an oath. 
 Lemmon maintains that the different sources of the moral 
ought give rise to moral dilemmas. He writes,  
 
My motive for carefully distinguishing some of the 
courses for “ought’s” earlier in the paper should now 
be apparent. For moral dilemmas of this sort we are 
considering will appear generally in the cases where 
these sources conflict. Our duty may conflict with our 
obligations, our duty may conflict with our moral 
principles, or our obligations may conflict with our 
moral principles. (p. 107) 
 
Lemmon’s claims thus support the argument for the 
incomparability of values.
13
  
                                                          
13 Judith DeCew (1990) claims that accepting moral dilemma need not lead to 
ethical relativism. She identifies two types of ethical relativism. The first 
says that there are at least some instances of conflicting ethical opinions 
that are equally valid in the sense that the application of rational method 
in ethics would support two conflicting ethical statements. The second says 
that there is no unique rational method in ethics. She argues that one can 
accept the existence of moral dilemmas and deny the second type of ethical 
relativism. In other words, one can believe that there are some irresolvable 
dilemmas where conflicting moral requirements are genuinely binding but 
cannot be satisfied at the same time. At the same time, one can believe that 
in a range of other cases, one can resolve the moral conflicts and reason to 
the truth about how to act.  
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Thomas Nagel (1987) advances another incomparability 
argument. He claims that there are different value claims: 
obligations, rights, utility, perfectionist ends, and private 
commitments. Obligations refer to specific obligations to other 
people or institutions. For example, they include obligations to 
one’s patients, family, community, and country. One incurs such 
obligations either by a deliberate undertaking or by a special 
relation to the person or institution.
14
  
Rights refer to constraints on action deriving from the 
general rights that everyone has either to do certain things or 
not to be treated in certain ways.  Examples include the rights 
to liberty and the rights to freedom from assault or coercion. 
These rights do not depend on obligations that others have 
incurred not to interfere, assault, or coerce. Rather, they are 
completely general and restrict what others may do to their 
possessors.  
Utility includes all aspects of benefit and harm to all 
people, not just to those with whom one has a special relation 
or to whom one has undertaken a special commitment. Utility 
takes into account the effects of one’s actions on everyone 
                                                          
14 Mary Mothersill (1996) says the incomparability argument does better than 
the equal-weight argument (where two non-overriding moral principles operate). 
It better captures the sense of paralysis that a moral agent experiences as a 
moral dilemma. Also, it rebuts an objection that the opponents of moral 
dilemmas raise—that there are no clear sets of priorities among moral 
principles and no possibility of appeal to a single reductive method. 
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else’s welfare. The examples of utility include the general 
benefits of medical research and education.  
Perfectionistic ends refer to the intrinsic values of 
certain achievements or creations apart from their values to the 
individuals that experience or use them. The examples include 
the intrinsic values of scientific discovery, artistic creation, 
and space exploration. These pursuits serve the interests of the 
individuals directly involved in them. They are not justified, 
however, solely in terms of these interests. Rather, they are 
considered to have intrinsic values even if they have no 
practical effects and if very few people understand them. 
Finally, private commitments refer to commitments to one’s 
own projects or undertakings. For example, if one sets out to 
climb Everest, translate Aristotle’s Metaphysics, master the 
Well-Tempered Clavier, or synthesize an amino acid, the pursuit 
of that project, once begun, acquires significant importance. 
Its importance involves not only justifying earlier investment 
of time and energy but also a desire to finish what one has 
begun.  
Nagel says that there is a fundamental division between 
personal and impersonal viewpoints, making comparison between 
them impossible. For example, there is a formal contrast between 
rights, obligations, and private commitments, on the one hand, 
and utility and perfectionistic ends, on the other. The claims 
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represented by individual obligations begin with relations 
between individuals. Although the satisfactory maintenance of 
these relations is part of the utilitarian conception of a good 
state of affairs, this is not the basic motive behind 
obligations. It may be good that one keeps one’s promises or 
looks after one’s children, but one’s reason for keeping one’s 
own promises is very different from one’s reason for wanting 
other people to keep theirs. One does not feel bound to keep 
one’s promises or to look after one’s children because it would 
be a good thing, impersonally considered. While one does other 
things for such reasons, a more personal outlook is involved: it 
is one’s own relation to other people or the institution or 
community that moves him or her, not a detached concern for what 
the best outcome would be. Similar observations can be made of 
general rights and private commitments. By contrast, the claims 
of utility or perfectionistic ends are impersonal or outcome-
centered: they concern what happens rather than what one does. 
In other words, what matters is one’s contribution to what 
happens. 
 Nagel says that this great division between personal and 
impersonal reasons, between agent-centered and outcome-centered 
reasons, or between subjective and objective reasons, is so 
basic that it renders implausible any reductive unification. One 
understands impersonal reasons when one detaches from one’s 
 
 
61 
 
personal situation and special relations to others. Utilitarian 
considerations arise in this way, when one’s detachment takes 
the form of adopting a general point of view. This outlook is 
very different from that which arises from one’s concern for 
special obligations to one’s family, friends, or colleagues. The 
two motives come from two different points of view, 
fundamentally irreducible to a common basis. When these two 
different points of view entail inconsistent actions, a moral 
dilemma arises. Nagel writes, 
 
My general point is that the formal differences among 
types of reason reflect differences of a fundamental 
nature in their sources, and that this rules out a 
certain kind of solution to conflicts among these 
types. . . Conflicts between personal and impersonal 
claims are ubiquitous. They cannot, in my view, be 
resolved by subsuming either of the points of view 
under the other, or both under a third. (pp. 179-180)  
 
Thus, according to Nagel, the incomparability of value claims 
gives rise to moral dilemmas.  
Earl Conee (1987) objects to the incomparability argument. 
He disagrees with Lemmon on the sources of the moral ought, 
saying that one does not incur moral duties or obligations 
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easily. He provides an example to support his point. Consider an 
executioner in some horrendous death camp. The executioner does 
have duties in virtue of being an executioner, but they are 
hardly moral duties; they are merely part of the job. Conee says 
that even if the executioner has previously committed himself to 
killing his victims, his commitment does not give rise to moral 
obligations. Conee thus casts doubt on Lemmon’s idea that moral 
dilemmas are created by different sources of the moral ought.  
My reply to Conee’s objection is that his example does not 
refute Lemmon’s view. One might grant that not every position 
confers one a moral duty, the executioner being one example. In 
most cases, however, one incurs a moral duty in virtue of a 
position that he or she holds. The examples include being a 
father, a fireman, a policeman, teacher, soldier, or a doctor. 
Conee’s example appears to be an atypical example. Providing one 
eccentric example does not refute what appears to be a general 
point that a position that one occupies gives rise to moral 
ought.   
Alan Donagan (1987), an advocate of Kantian ethics, makes a 
similar objection. According to Kant, there is a distinction 
between moral duties and grounds of moral duties (this idea will 
be discussed in detail in a later chapter). He says that the 
grounds of moral duties can entail incompatible actions, but 
moral duties cannot. Suppose that a fireman must rescue people 
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in a burning building. The fireman wants to rescue everyone but 
cannot physically do so. Whom should he save? Donagan says that 
this is a case where the grounds of duties conflict. If there 
were only one person in the burning building, that person’s need 
for help would hold the field as the only ground binding to a 
duty. There are multiple people and thus multiple grounds of 
duties, however, and none holds the field as a ground binding to 
a duty. As a result, they remain the grounds of duties that are 
in conflict. Since they are the grounds of moral duties but not 
genuine moral duties, the conflicts they raise are practical 
conflicts but not moral conflicts.  
According to Donagan, some philosophers are convinced that 
a plausible moral theory cannot allow the possibility of a moral 
dilemma because they assume that the question of “What shall I 
do?” is a moral question. If morality is the sum of the 
conditions on human action unconditionally required by practical 
reason — as the rationalists maintain — then for the most part, 
moral considerations will not suffice to answer the question. 
Among those human actions that are morally permissible, very few 
discharge perfect duties. The larger number of actions discharge 
the imperfect duties of self-culture and beneficence. Most 
actions, many of which are the most difficult to decide upon, 
have little or nothing to do with morality. In many situations, 
the considerations that enter into making a decision are 
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multiple and practical: considerations of desire, convenience, 
affection, indignation, courtesy, and so on. 
I believe that it is debatable whether the fireman case 
represents a conflict of practical considerations rather than 
moral considerations. Even if one grants this point to Donagan, 
a conflict or moral considerations or a moral dilemma can arise 
within the rationalist framework. Suppose that one makes 
promises to two people and later finds out that he or she cannot 
keep both. Donagan would agree that promise-keeping has moral 
significance. According to Kant, promise-keeping is a perfect 
duty. Yet this perfect duty can entail incompatible actions. No 
matter which action one takes, he or she is bound to violate 
that perfect duty. Therefore, one cannot eliminate the 
possibility of moral dilemmas within the rationalist framework. 
Conee’s and Donagan’s objections, however, share something 
in common. Both argue for a narrower scope of morality: moral 
duties or obligations arise neither too often nor too easily. 
Their point has plausibility because the scope of morality is 
somewhat vague. It is difficult to separate clearly moral 
considerations from non-moral considerations. From their point 
of view, for example, Nagel’s perfectionistic ends and private 
commitments may not qualify as moral considerations. Also, it is 
true that not every position that one occupies gives rise to a 
moral duty. A narrower scope of morality implies that what 
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appear to be moral dilemmas are the conflicts between practical 
considerations rather than moral considerations. 
My reply to this objection is that although the scope of 
morality is not clear-cut, most would agree that certain values 
and actions bear moral significance. Examples include one’s 
obligation to pay debt, one’s obligation to help someone in 
distress, and one’s right to freedom. It is difficult to deny 
that these have no moral considerations but are merely practical 
considerations.
15
 Conflicts can arise between these moral 
considerations.  
On the other hand, Sinnott-Armstrong (1985 and 1988) agrees 
with the incomparability argument but makes a more refined 
argument. He says that the conventional incomparability argument 
is defective. Consider Nagel’s argument: if the variety of 
viewpoints alone implied incomparability, no values of 
fundamentally different kinds would ever be comparable. Yet some 
fundamentally different values are comparable. If one action 
produces a little more pleasure but violates many rights, then 
                                                          
15  Mary Mothersill (1996) says that there are many disputes about what 
qualifies a reason or principle as “moral.” This point is important because 
the opponents of moral dilemmas often say that their thesis—that obligations 
never conflict—applies only to conflicts that are moral rather than practical. 
Mothersill says that rather than trying to find an acceptable criterion for a 
principle’s being moral, one should leave the stone unturned. Both the 
advocates and opponents of moral dilemmas seem content with traditional 
examples of morality—one should tell the truth, keep one’s promises, relieve 
other’s suffering, and so forth. None of the disputants is a Nietzschean, nor 
does any of them show sympathy with an existential ethic. 
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the latter, a personal value, seems to override the former, an 
impersonal value. On the other hand, if an astronomer can gain 
much important knowledge about an unexpected comet only by 
breaking a trivial promise, then the former, an impersonal 
value, appears to override the latter, a personal value.  
Sinnott-Armstrong says that these and other examples 
suggest that the only plausible view of incomparability admits 
that a moral principle is comparable with another moral 
principle in some situations, but in other situations, it is not. 
Sinnott-Armstrong calls this relation “limited incomparability” 
and says that limited incomparability is sufficient to give rise 
to moral dilemmas. 
One theory that supports the idea of limited 
incomparability is called the non-defective ranker theory or the 
ideal observer theory. According to this theory, non-defective 
rankers can sort out conflicting moral principles.  The theory 
requires listing any defects that might distort the rankers’ 
choices or rankings. The list usually includes ignorance, 
partiality, irrationality, and so on. Non-defective rankers do 
not possess any defects on the list.  
Non-defective rankers are then used to resolve moral 
principles that prescribe incompatible actions. In the case of 
overriding, one moral principle is said to override another if 
all non-defective rankers judge that the former is stronger. 
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Universal agreement is necessary for one moral principle to 
override another. Thus, if non-defective rankers do not all 
agree, neither moral principle overrides the other, resulting in 
a moral dilemma. In addition, moral principles are deemed 
unequal in strength if not all rankers agree that they are equal 
in strength. In that case, moral principles are deemed 
incomparable.  
The important question is whether non-defective rankers 
ever disagree. In some cases, all non-defective rankers agree 
that one moral principle is stronger than the other. For example, 
only defective rankers would rank a moral principle not to cause 
a small amount of pain above a moral principle to keep a solemn 
promise or not to cause a major disability. In other cases, non-
defective rankers disagree even though there nothing seems 
defective about them. For example, when keeping a promise or 
refusing to lie would cause a fair amount of pain, rankers 
disagree about which moral principle is stronger. Admittedly, it 
is possible that one of the rankers is either ignorant or 
partial in some way. There is often no evidence of any relevant 
defect, however, because while rankers do not know the people 
who will be affected, they know the probable effects of each 
alternative.  
David Brink (1996) holds a similar view. He says that 
incomparability presumably exists only if there are different 
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scales or dimensions of assessment. He distinguishes between 
strong incomparability and weak incomparability. Strong 
incomparability exists between types of acts x and y just in the 
case that no token of type x is comparable with any of type y. 
On the other hand, there is weak incomparability between types 
of acts x and y just in the case that some tokens of type x are 
not comparable with some t of type y, while others are. Thus, 
weak incomparability allows for substantial, though partial, 
comparability. Brink says that even if one has different 
dimensions of assessment, strong incomparability seems 
implausibly extreme, while weak incomparability sounds more 
plausible.  
 
5.3. Argument from Symmetry 
Another argument for the existence of moral dilemmas is 
called the argument from symmetry. According to this argument, a 
moral dilemma arises when a single moral principle prompts a 
moral agent to act in incompatible ways. Many symmetrical cases 
can be discussed, but the best-known case is Sophie’s Choice, a 
novel by William Styron (1980). After Sophie arrives with her 
two children at a Nazi concentration camp, a guard orders her to 
choose one child. He tells her that the child she chooses will 
be killed and the other child will live in the children’s 
barracks.  
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 Sophie does not want to choose at all, but the guard also 
tells her that if she refuses to choose, both children will be 
killed. She knows that he will carry out his threats. In this 
case, a single moral principle operates — that of not 
participating in one’s child’s death. This principle operates in 
a symmetric and opposite way. To choose the first child would be 
to cooperate in an evil scheme and, more particularly, in her 
own child’s murder. Choosing the second child has the same 
result. So the moral principle prompts the mother not to choose 
the first child. It also prompts the mother not to choose the 
second child.  
Her situation is a moral dilemma if the moral principle 
applying to each child does not override each other. In other 
words, she faces a moral dilemma if the moral principle vis-à-
vis the first child and the moral principle vis-à-vis the second 
child do not override each other. There seems to be no morally 
relevant difference between the children, so she does not have 
an overriding reason to choose one child over the other. The 
book does in fact suggest that there is some difference: the 
younger child is more dependent and thus less likely to survive 
in the children’s barracks. The example, however, can be 
modified so that that there is no morally relevant difference 
between the children. Such symmetry is extreme, but it is 
possible. Therefore, Sophie faces a moral dilemma.  
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Another case of symmetry involves the moral principle of 
promise-keeping. Suppose that a person may make two promises 
with the intention of keeping each but discovers later that due 
to unforeseeable circumstances, he or she cannot keep both. In 
this case, assuming there is no morally relevant difference 
between the two promises, a single moral principle creates a 
moral dilemma.  
The trolley case provides another example. A trolley driver 
might run over one person if he or she keeps pressing down on a 
lever and over another person if he or she lets up on the lever. 
The lever ensures that both alternatives are positive actions. 
No satisfactory resolution is possible because no morally 
relevant difference exists between the alternatives. The moral 
principle of not harming others thus creates a moral dilemma.  
Brink (1996), however, denies that a situation of symmetry 
creates moral dilemmas. In such a situation, according to Brink, 
a moral agent has a disjunctive moral requirement. He 
distinguishes between prima facie obligations and all-things-
considered obligations (a distinction to be discussed in detail 
later). Although prima facie obligations can entail inconsistent 
actions, all-things-considered obligations do not. He writes,  
 
But she may perform either of the disjuncts in order 
to fulfill her all-things-considered obligation. 
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Whichever disjuncts she performs, she will leave a 
strong prima facie obligation unperformed, and this 
may be cause for a kind of regret or compunction for 
the moral force to which she does not respond. But as 
long as she performs one of the disjuncts, she will 
have done nothing impermissible. (p. 115)  
 
According to this view, in the case of promise-keeping, a moral 
agent ought to keep one promise or the other. Sophie therefore 
ought to choose either one child or the other. An analogous case 
supports this point. Consider a person that wants to make a 
contribution to one of several charities. If a person could 
afford to make a meaningful contribution to only one charity, 
the existence of several other charities would not prompt one to 
say that no matter what the person chooses, he or she would not 
be acting morally.
16
 Rather, a proper response would be that the 
person ought to make a contribution to one of the charities. 
Similarly, it is perfectly reasonable and not arbitrary to say 
that when a symmetric situation prompts incompatible actions, a 
moral agent ought to take one of the actions.  
 I find Brink’s view unsatisfactory. Saying that a moral 
agent has a disjunctive requirement in a symmetry case is no 
                                                          
16 This example is drawn from McConnell (2014). 
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different from saying that the moral agent faces a moral dilemma. 
It is misleading to claim that a disjunctive requirement is a 
solution to a moral dilemma. Compare the case of Sartre’s 
student discussed previously and the case of making promises to 
two people. How is the former case (a non-symmetric case) 
different from the latter (a symmetric case)? There are 
important similarities between them. In both cases, a moral 
agent feels that he or she ought to take both actions yet cannot 
do so. In both cases, neither moral principle overrides the 
other (the promise-keeping principle does not override itself). 
Furthermore, in both cases, no matter which action the moral 
agent takes, he or she is bound to violate a moral principle 
that he or she holds. From the action-guidance perspective, it 
is not practically helpful to tell the student that he has a 
disjunctive requirement — that he should either stay with his 
mother or join the Free French. Similarly, it is not practically 
helpful to tell the promisor that he or she should keep one 
promise or the other.  
 Furthermore, Brink’s charity example does not help to prove 
his point. Suppose that there are two charities to choose from. 
One charity helps wounded soldiers who have returned from war, 
and the other helps victims of a recent natural disaster. Both 
charities lack sufficient funds, and many people — both soldiers 
and victims — are dying every day from lack of proper treatment. 
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The situation for both is urgent and serious. In this case, a 
moral agent would experience an emotional difficulty and 
conflict similar to that which he or she would experience in the 
cases of Sartre’s student and Sophie’s choice. The strength of a 
moral principle can vary depending on the situation. The facts 
of the situation can be changed so that a moral agent can 
experience a critical moral dilemma under a single moral 
principle.   
Donagan (1987) makes a different objection to the argument 
from symmetry. He discusses the case of making promises to two 
people. As an advocate of Kantian ethics, he argues that the 
moral principle of promise-keeping does not create a moral 
dilemma. He says that most promises are made and accepted on a 
twofold condition: (1) the promisor has acceptable reason to 
believe that he or she can and may do what he or she promises 
and (2) if it turns out that he or she either cannot or may not, 
the promisee will not be entitled to performance. If the 
promisor fails to satisfy his or her part of this twofold 
condition, he or she does wrong in making the promise, and the 
promisor’s consequent moral difficulties are his or her fault 
and not that of circumstances or the moral system.  
If the promisee demands that the promisor keep his or her 
promise, even though the latter cannot or may not keep it 
through no fault of his or her own, the promisor may reject that 
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demand as contrary to the condition on which his or her promise 
was accepted. A difficulty, however, remains. It sometimes 
happens that, although a promise is given and accepted on the 
condition just described, the promisee does not accept the 
promisor’s reason for believing that he or she can and may keep 
his word. This disagreement may not appear when the promise is 
made, because a promisee normally does not inquire what the 
promisor’s reason is for believing that he or she can and may 
keep his word. The difficulty is resolved by the following 
additional condition: it is wrong for a promisor to make a 
promise on any condition that he or she does not believe the 
promisee to understand the promisor to make it.  
I believe that Donagan’s objection to the argument from 
symmetry is not persuasive. It is not clear where these 
conditions of promise that he discusses come from. Does Donagan 
know them from observing how people actually make and perform 
promises? Do these conditions come from the rationalist moral 
theory? Are these conditions part of a particular cultural 
tradition? Donagan does not explain the source of the conditions. 
He does not provide any specific reasons to justify them.  
Furthermore, even if one accepts these conditions, there is 
no guarantee that there is a mutual agreement between the 
promisor and promise concerning the conditions. The promisor may 
not correctly appreciate how the promisee understands the 
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conditions of the promise. For example, an ambiguous or 
unanticipated situation may occur such that the promisor and the 
promisee do not share the same understanding of the conditions 
of the promise. The promisor and the promisee cannot comprehend 
and foresee every contingency surrounding the promise. When the 
promisor’s and the promisee’s understandings do not coincide, 
Donagan is unable to tell them which promise to keep and which 
promise to break. Thus, Donagan’s conditions of promise are not 
sufficiently complete and as such, fail to eliminate the 
possibility of moral dilemmas.  
 
Chapter 6. Arguments against the Existence of Moral 
Dilemmas 
Several arguments have been made against the existence of 
moral dilemmas. Among them are the argument from the distinction 
between prima facie and actual duties, the argument from 
exceptions, and the argument from intentions, the argument from 
the non-action-guiding evaluations, and the argument from the 
distinction between negative and positive moral principles.
17
 In 
                                                          
17 There is an additional class of arguments against the existence of moral 
dilemmas. This class derives from deontic logic. It has long been recognized 
that the claim that moral dilemmas exist is inconsistent with commonly 
accepted principles of deontic logic. Two principles in particular have 
received more attention. According to the agglomeration principle, if a 
person ought to do one thing and ought to do another thing, then the person 
ought to do both things. According to the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, if 
a person ought to do something, then the person can do that thing. Some have 
argued that moral dilemmas are inconsistent with the conjunction of these two 
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what follows, I will explain each argument and offer the 
respective objections.  
 
6.1. Argument from the Distinction between Prima Facie and 
Actual Duties 
One of the arguments against the existence of moral 
dilemmas comes from the distinction between prima facie and 
actual duties. The distinction between them originates from W. 
D. Ross (1987).
18
 He identifies different types of prima facie 
duties: duties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, 
beneficence, self-improvement, and duties of non-maleficence. 
The (1) duties of fidelity rest on previous acts. For example, 
one has a duty to keep a promise if one has made it to others. 
The (2) duties of reparation rest on previous wrongful acts. For 
example, if one has caused damage to another person’s property, 
one has a duty to pay for it. Some duties rest on previous acts 
of other men. If others provide one with beneficial services, 
one has a duty to express gratitude. These duties are called the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
principles. In this essay, I do not deal with this class of arguments. 
Instead, I focus on informal arguments against the existence of moral 
dilemmas.  
18 Richard Price (1969) holds a similar view. Against the view that the whole 
virtue consists in benevolence, he claims that there are six different heads 
of virtue, each of which is self-evident. Although he thinks that it is the 
same eternal reason that commends in them all, he says that they sometimes 
lead one in contrary ways. When this happens, on may be rendered unable to 
determine what he or she ought to do.  
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(3) duties of gratitude. On the other hand, some duties relate 
to preventing the distribution of pleasure or happiness that is 
not in accordance with the merit of the persons involved. For 
example, if a person unjustly enriches himself, one has a duty 
to correct it. These are the (4) duties of justice.  
Some duties rest on the fact that there are other human 
beings in the world whose conditions one can improve with 
respect to virtue, intelligence, or pleasure. These are the (5) 
duties of beneficence. On the other hand, the (6) duties of 
self-improvement concerns improving one’s own condition with 
respect to virtue or intelligence. Finally, some duties relate 
to not injuring others. For example, one has a duty not to kill 
another or steal from another. These are the (7) duties of non-
maleficence.  
Ross says that these prima facie duties can conflict with 
one another. For example, one could have a prima facie duty of 
reparation, such as a duty to help people who helped you move 
your belongings, and a prima facie duty of fidelity, such as 
taking your children on a promised trip to the park and these 
duties could conflict. Nonetheless, there can never be a true 
moral dilemma, Ross would argue, because one of the prima facie 
duties in a given situation is always the weightiest, and that 
one overrules all the others. This is the actual duty, the 
action that the person ought to perform. 
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  To explain the difference between the two types of duty, 
Ross draws an analogy between morality and natural laws. He 
compares a prima facie duty with a force on a body and an actual 
duty with an actual movement of the body. He writes, 
 
Another instance of the same distinction may be found 
in the operation of natural laws. Qua subject to the 
force of gravitation towards some other body, each 
body tends to move in a particular direction with a 
particular velocity; but its actual movement depends 
on all factors to which it is subject. It is only by 
recognizing the distinction that we can preserve the 
absoluteness of laws of nature, and only by 
recognizing a corresponding distinction that we can 
preserve the absoluteness of the general principles of 
morality. (p. 94) 
 
Ross points out, however, that although natural forces and prima 
facie duties are analogous, there is an important difference 
between them. He says no causal relation exists between prima 
facie duties and actual duties. He writes, 
 
But an important difference between the two cases must 
be pointed out. When we say that in virtue of 
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gravitation a body tends to move in a certain way, we 
are referring to a causal influence actually exercised 
on it by another body or other bodies. When we say that 
in virtue of being deliberately untrue a certain remark 
tends to be wrong, we are referring to no causal 
relation, to no relation that involves succession in 
time, but to such a relation as connects the various 
attributes of a mathematical figure. And if the word 
‘tendency’ is thought to suggest too much a causal 
relation, it is better to talk of certain types of act 
being prima facie right or wrong (or of different 
persons as having different and possibility conflicting 
claims upon us), than of their tending to be right or 
wrong. (p. 94) 
 
 How does one know that an act is a prima facie duty? 
According to Ross, the proposition that a prima facie duty 
expresses is self-evident not because it is evident from the 
beginning of our lives. Rather, it is self-evident because when 
one has developed sufficient mental maturity and given 
sufficient attention to the proposition, it is evident without 
any need of proof. It is self-evident, just as a mathematical 
axiom or the validity of a form of inference is evident. The 
moral order expressed in the proposition is just as much part of 
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the fundamental nature of the universe as is the spatial or 
numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or 
arithmetic.  
On the other hand, one’s knowledge of an actual duty has 
none of the certainty attached to one’s knowledge of a prima 
facie duty. According to Ross, a statement is certain only in 
one of two cases: when it is either self-evident or a valid 
conclusion from self-evident premises. And one’s knowledge of an 
actual duty has neither of these characteristics. It is not 
self-evident. When an act has these characteristics — when it is 
prima facie right in some respects and prima face wrong in 
others — one is not certain whether one ought or ought not to do 
it.  
Furthermore, one’s knowledge of an actual duty is not a 
logical conclusion drawn from self-evident premises. The only 
possible self-evident premises are the general principles 
stating an act’s prima facie rightness or wrongness qua having 
the different characteristics. Even if one could apprehend the 
extent to which an act would tend to bring about advantages and 
disadvantages for the people involved, there is no principle by 
which one can draw the definite conclusion that the act is on 
the whole right or wrong. 
  Therefore, when it comes to knowledge of an actual duty in 
a particular situation, one has only a probable opinion. There 
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is no general rule on how to assess the comparative stringency 
of the prima facie duties. Instead, what one needs is good 
judgment about which one of the prima facie duties has the 
greatest stringency. 
Ross says that the distinction between prima facie and 
actual duties has the virtue of explaining moral residue. 
Suppose that an actual duty and a prima facie duty entail 
inconsistent actions, and that a moral agent fulfills the actual 
duty. The moral agent then feels “compunction” for not 
fulfilling the prima facie duty. In addition, the moral agent 
feels obligated to make up for the damage resulting from not 
fulfilling the prima facie duty. Ross writes,  
 
When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and 
indeed morally obligated to break, a promise in order 
to relieve some one’s distress, we do not for a moment 
cease to recognize a prima facie duty to keep our 
promise, and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame 
or repentance, but certainly compunction, for behaving 
as we do; we recognize, further, that it is our duty 
to make up somehow to the promise for the breaking of 
the promise. (p. 93) 
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 Brink (1996) holds a similar view as Ross. He distinguishes 
between prima facie and all-things-considered obligations or 
duties. A prima facie obligation to do x means that there is a 
moral reason to do x, or that x possesses a right-making 
characteristic. But prima facie obligations can be, and often 
are, defeated by other weightier obligations. A prima facie 
obligation to do x, that is superior to all others, constitutes 
an all-things-considered obligation to do x. An all-things-
considered moral obligation to do x means that on the balance, x 
is what one ought to do.  
 According to Brink, one should treat prima facie 
obligations as moral factors or forces that interact with each 
other to determine all-things-considered obligations. To 
determine all-things-considered obligations, one must do moral 
factor addition.
 19
 It is not essential that one always be able 
to assign precise numerical values to the various moral forces. 
What is important is that the moral status of an act results 
from adding the moral forces, positive and negative, contributed 
by the various morally relevant factors. The act with the 
highest moral total is the all-things-considered obligation. In 
this respect, prima facie obligations are moral forces not 
cancelled by the existence of other moral forces, even if the 
                                                          
19 Paul Pietroski (1993) provides a detailed discussion of the similarity 
between natural forces and prima facie duties.  
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latter override the former. Brink calls this the metaphysical 
view of prima facie obligations.  
 The metaphysical view stands in contrast to the statistical 
view of prima facie obligations, which Brink believes is flawed. 
Sometimes Ross says that prima facie obligations refer to 
features of an act that tend to make acts of that type 
obligatory. This tendency claim admits a statistical reading: 
although nothing about a token act may make it obligatory, the 
act belongs to a type or class of acts many of whose tokens are 
all-things-considered obligations. This view says nothing about 
the act’s contribution to the all-things-considered obligation.  
 Brink provides an example to illustrate the distinction. 
One might analyze the claim that Jennifer is a valuable player 
as a claim that she tends to help her team win games. But this 
should not be analyzed as the statistical claim that when she 
plays, her team usually wins. That analysis does not convey the 
idea that she is a positive force even in the games it loses. 
One must understand that her role is being a positive factor on 
the field, whether the outcome is a win or a loss. This is how 
one must analyze the tendency for Jennifer to win games if the 
claim of her being a valuable player is to be analyzed.  
  My objection to the argument from the distinction between 
prima facie and actual duties is that it does not rule out the 
possibility of moral dilemmas. The argument would rule out a 
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moral dilemma if in every situation where two prima facie duties 
entail inconsistent actions, only one of them always qualifies 
as an actual duty. Ross discusses the epistemic difficulty that 
a moral agent may experience in figuring out an actual duty. The 
difficulty arises from the absence of a general rule on how to 
assess the comparative stringency of the prima facie duties. The 
epistemic difficulty, however, does not mean that an actual duty 
always exists when two prima facie duties entail inconsistent 
actions.  
Consider Ross’ analogy between morality and natural laws 
and Brink’s metaphysical view of prima facie duties. Suppose 
that two equal and opposite forces impinge on a body at rest. 
The forces at work would cancel out and there would be no actual 
movement of the body. The body would remain at rest. Similarly, 
suppose that two equally stringent prima facie duties influence 
a moral agent in opposite directions: the degree to which each 
prima face duty affects the moral agent is the same. In such a 
case, there would be no actual duty. This situation would be a 
moral dilemma. 
Although Ross says that an analogy between natural forces 
and prima facie duties is not perfect, the similarities between 
them seem important and relevant. These similarities suggest 
that just as no actual movement occurs when two equal and 
opposite forces impinge on an object in nature, no actual duty 
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arises when two equally stringent and opposite prima facie 
duties influence a moral agent. Brink’s metaphysical view of 
prima facie duties also supports the same point. The burden thus 
seems to rest on the opponents of moral dilemmas to prove that 
there is no situation where two equally stringent prima facie 
duties can pull the moral agent in opposite directions at the 
same time.  
 
6.2. Argument from Exceptions 
Another argument against the existence of moral dilemmas is 
the argument from exceptions. According to it, a moral principle 
has exceptions, and when a situation is an exception to the 
moral principle, the moral principle does not apply to the 
situation. One can thus deny the existence of moral dilemmas by 
saying that whenever moral principles prescribe incompatible 
actions, the situation is an exception to one of the moral 
principles.  
  Consider Plato’s example in which the moral principle of 
repaying debts conflicts with the moral principle of protecting 
others from harm. In this case, one creates an exception to the 
former moral principle so that the modified principle would read: 
“One ought to repay one’s debts unless to do so brings harm to 
people.” The modified principle does not apply to the situation, 
bypassing conflict with the other moral principle. If, in every 
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situation where the moral principles prescribe incompatible 
actions — one of the moral principles were an exception in this 
manner, no situation would count as a moral dilemma.  
The argument from exceptions is attributed to R. M. Hare 
(1952). He argues that whenever a moral agent encounters 
exceptional circumstances, he or she must modify moral 
principles.
20
 He distinguishes between two types of moral 
principles. The first type is the moral principles such as one 
about taking time off work, where exceptions are allowed as long 
as they are not too numerous. The second is moral principles 
where exceptions are not limited by a numerical restriction but 
by the peculiarities of particular situations. His example is 
‘Never say what is false.’ He says of such moral principles: 
 
It is part of our moral development to turn them from 
provisional principles into precise principles with 
their exceptions definitely laid down . . . If we 
accept and continue to accept such a principle we 
cannot, as in the cases of the rule about taking time 
                                                          
20  In his Moral Thinking, Hare (1981) has a more complicated position. He 
contrasts the intuitive perception of moral conflict with a higher type of 
critical thinking that removes the conflict. He associates the former with a 
thinker whom he calls the “the prole.” He associates the latter with a more 
exemplary figure whom he calls “the archangel.” He says that a major revision 
in ordinary ways of thinking is required to eliminate the moral conflict. 
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off work, break it and leave the principle intact. (p. 
54) 
 
Roger Trigg (1971) says that, from Hare’s point of view, a moral 
principle must always have a ceteris paribus clause written into 
it. However precise the moral principle is, it is possible to 
invent a situation in which it looks as though a moral agent 
ought to disobey the principle: there are very few actions which 
could not be justified if the fate of the world depended on what 
the moral agent did. This means that in such extraordinary 
situations, the moral agent should not think of himself or 
herself as breaking the moral principle. Rather, he or she 
should modify the principle so that it does not apply to the 
situation.
21
  
                                                          
21  Donagan (1996) says Hare’s view can be traced to Sidgwick. According to 
Sidgwick, utilitarianism is essentially a refinement and correction of the 
intuitional morality of common sense—the intuitively sanctioned moral rules 
that children are bought up to regard as binding. The justification of 
observing these rules is twofold: that without some system of teachable rules 
that are generally received as self-evidently binding, people generally would 
be less happy, and that those rules accepted in the late-nineteenth-century 
western world on the whole promoted the general happiness better than those 
of previous ages. What rules require is unclear in many cases, however, and 
in some cases they generate dilemmas. This compels moralists to regard these 
rules as inexact and not wholly true, and to look for an exact and wholly 
true principle to guide conduct in cases where they fail; they find this 
principle in the utilitarian principle. Sidgwick says that the rules of 
intuitional morality are therefore to be acted on except when what they 
require is either unclear or inconsistent; but then what is to be done must 
be directly calculated from the utilitarian principle itself. 
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Trigg says, however, that the argument from exceptions has 
a downside: it may render moral principles useless or vacuous. 
If a moral agent is allowed to create a list of exceptions or to 
attach a ceteris paribus clause to a moral principle, he or she 
faces an insidious danger. If the moral agent believes that a 
moral principle can always be modified in the light of 
particular cases, he or she may not regard the moral principle 
as providing strict guidelines of conduct. Instead, he or she 
may feel free to reject the moral principle whenever he or she 
believes that circumstances warrant it. He or she is then likely 
to make every situation an exception to the moral principle when 
doing so serves his or her interest. The slide of a moral 
principle into complete vacuity is easy once the moral agent has 
allowed the introduction of the ceteris paribus clause.  
For example, most people would accept the moral principle 
that one must keep one’s promise, other things being equal. In 
reality, however, other things are not equal. How should a moral 
agent decide when to follow the moral principle and when to make 
an exception to it? If he or she must examine the merits of each 
particular situation to decide whether or not the moral 
principle applies to the situation, the moral principle becomes 
useless as a guide for action.  
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Trigg compares the problem of creating an exception to a 
moral principle with the problem that rule-utilitarianism faces 
vis-a-vis act-utilitarianism.  He writes, 
 
This is the constant danger which faces rule-
utilitarians. They must always be aware that their 
present rule might be refined in a way which would 
produce better consequences. They should always be 
ready to accept that their rule ought not to cover the 
particular circumstances they might be in. Their 
position then seems remarkably similar to that of an 
act-utilitarian who looks at each situation on its 
merits, although perhaps with the aid of ‘rules of 
thumb’. Both seem to be treating the situation or the 
particular action as primary. The rule in fact becomes 
merely a summary of all the decisions made in the past 
in particular circumstances. It might help us to be 
consistent in the future if exactly similar situations 
arise, but as situations very often are not exactly 
similar even in morally relevant ways we still have to 
make up our minds without any rule to guide us. 
Whether the rule is a guide is precisely what is at 
issue in such a case. (p. 43) 
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 My objection to the argument from exceptions is that a 
moral agent still faces the difficulty of deciding to which 
moral principle he or she should create an exception. Consider, 
again, Sartre’s student case discussed earlier. In this case, a 
moral dilemma arises from the conflict between the moral 
principle of filial piety and the moral principle of patriotism. 
According to the argument from exceptions, the student can avoid 
the moral dilemma by creating an exception to one of the moral 
principles. The difficulty, however, is to decide which moral 
principle to act on. Neither moral principle seems to override 
the other; they seem to be equal in strength. The argument from 
exceptions is silent on which moral principle to create an 
exception to and hence is unable to eliminate the possibility of 
moral dilemmas.
22
  
I believe that another problem with the argument from 
exceptions is that it does not account for the moral residue 
that a moral agent experiences. Suppose that a moral agent 
somehow successfully figures out which moral principle to follow 
                                                          
22 Christine Vitrano asks whether an obvious exception exists for either moral 
principle. For example, with Sartre’s student, one can say that filial piety 
trumps his other duty because patriotism only applies when the family has 
other living children. Since his brother is deceased, his obligation is to 
stay with his mother. It is debatable, however, whether an exception to moral 
principle is obvious or not. People may hold different views about whether 
the fact that one is the only living child should create an exception to the 
moral principle of patriotism. One could reasonably argue that although this 
issue is a relevant consideration, it is not important enough to create an 
exception to the moral principle of patriotism.  
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or reject. Imagine that Sartre’s student, after much 
deliberation, resolves to create an exception to the moral 
principle of filial piety. He decides to honor his duty as a 
citizen and join the Free French in England. If the situation is 
an exception to the moral principle of filial piety, the moral 
principle does not apply to the situation.  
The argument from exceptions, however, cannot explain why 
the student would experience moral residue. If the moral 
principle of filial piety does not apply to the situation, the 
student should not feel remorse or guilt about leaving her 
mother. In fact, it would be strange for the student to feel 
bad: he would experience remorse or guilt about violating the 
moral principle that has no relevance to his situation. It has 
been said, however, that the student quite appropriately would 
experience remorse or guilt. Most people would expect him to 
feel remorse or guilt about leaving his mother. The moral 
residue that the student experiences indicates that the moral 
principle of filial piety still applies to the situation.  
Trigg supports this point. He discusses how the moral 
principle that a moral agent has not acted on still makes a 
moral demand on him or her. For example, even when the moral 
agent breaks a promise that he or she has made for an 
unavoidable and understandable reason, the idea of breaking the 
promise can disturb him or her:   
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. . . the fact that we have had to break a promise may 
be excusable but it is regrettable. If we do not keep 
a promise, the promise does not disappear as if it had 
never been made. There would be nothing to apologize 
for and nothing to put right if that was true. An 
excuse may explain why I should not be blamed for not 
doing X. It is not an explanation as to why it is not 
true that I ought to (or ought to have done) X. I may 
be excused for failing to respond to certain moral 
demands. An excuse does not remove these demands. (p. 
47) 
 
Trigg says that the moral agent’s experiencing moral residue 
means that the moral principle that he or she does not act on 
applies to the situation. He says that when the moral agent does 
not act on one of the moral principles, he or she should be 
described as breaking the moral principle rather than modifying 
it.  
Hillel Steiner (1973) takes issue with Trigg’s argument. He 
does so by showing that the situation at issue calls for the 
application of an entirely new moral principle. Steiner says 
that in a moral dilemma, a moral agent affirms two moral 
principles. These are (1) ‘One ought to do A when C’ and (2) 
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‘One ought to do A2 when C2’. Although one is able to perform 
either A or A2, he or she cannot do both. Although factual 
conditions corresponding to both C and C2 exist, the situation 
should be more accurately described as C + C2, which is 
different from either C or C2. Therefore, the moral principles 
prescribing what one ought to do when C or when C2 do not apply 
to this situation. Rather, what applies to the situation is a 
moral principle prescribing what one ought to do when C + C2. 
This is an entirely different moral principle, enjoying the same 
logical status as the other two principles. 
 Steiner says that it is unlikely that the moral principle 
prescribing what one ought to do when C + C2 entails an action 
different from either A or A2. Yet there is no reason for 
inferring that the moral principle covering C + C2 is simply an 
extension of one of the two other moral principles. Suppose that 
the third moral principle says, ‘One ought to do A when C + C2’. 
The fact that A is also the action prescribed for ‘when C’ does 
not mean that the third moral principle is an extension of the 
first moral principle. 
 One can illustrate this point by considering yet another 
moral principle that says, ‘One ought to do A when C3’. The fact 
that this fourth moral principle prescribes A does not mean that 
the fourth moral principle is an extension of the first moral 
principle. In other words, the mere fact that two moral 
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principles prescribe the same action does not mean that one is 
an extension of the other. It is a matter of ascertaining what 
moral principle actually applies to the given situation. 
How does one discover which moral principle applies in a 
given situation? Steiner says that to do so, a moral agent must 
examine the situation to find out its morally relevant 
characteristics. He or she must figure out whether a factual 
characteristic of the situation is morally relevant by referring 
to the moral principles. The moral principles stipulate that 
when certain describable circumstances occur, these obligate a 
moral agent to act in certain ways. These circumstances, 
however, subsume a wide range of factual statements. For 
example, Sartre’s student affirmed the moral principles 
enjoining him to act in certain ways ‘when foreign aggressors 
overrun one’s country’ or ‘when one’s mother requires 
attentions’. There are a vast number of factual statements that 
would each constitute partial descriptions of the circumstances 
described by ‘the overrunning of one’s country by foreign 
aggressors’ or ‘the need from one’s mother for attention’. In 
fact, any one factual statement may partially describe a wide 
range of different circumstances, covered by a correspondingly 
wide range of moral principles. Consequently, in order to know 
what moral principle applies in a particular situation, a moral 
agent must ascertain all the morally relevant facts about that 
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situation. The situation at issue includes all the facts 
subsumed under both C and C2. Hence, the moral principle which 
applies to the situation is that which applies ‘when C + C2’. 
  My objection to Steiner’s argument is that it does not 
solve the problem of moral dilemmas. Suppose that one grants 
that the situation where two moral principles prescribe 
incompatible actions requires the application of an entirely new 
moral principle. The difficulty remains, however, in identifying 
the new moral principle. A moral dilemma is a situation where it 
is difficult to decide which of two conflicting moral principles 
applies to the situation; there is no compelling reason to 
choose one moral principle over the other. Suppose that there 
are two candidates for the new moral principle: ‘One ought to do 
A when C + C2’ and ‘One ought to do A2 when C + C2’. Suppose 
also that A and A2 are incompatible actions and that one has 
equally compelling reasons to perform each. In this situation, 
one faces the difficulty of deciding which new moral principle 
to apply. Even if one grants Steiner’s point that the new 
principles are not extensions of the old moral principles — ‘One 
ought to do A when C’ and ‘One ought to do A2 when C2’, the 
difficulty of choosing which moral principle still remains.   
Furthermore, I believe that Steiner’s argument cannot 
account for the moral residue that a moral agent experiences. 
Suppose the moral agent adopts the new moral principle — ‘One 
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ought to do A when C +C2’ — to resolve the conflict between the 
two moral principles. Suppose also that he or she performs A 
according to the new moral principle. The moral agent is then 
supposed to be morally satisfied with his or her performance; he 
or she has acted according to the new moral principle correctly 
applied to the situation. The moral agent, however, would 
appropriately experience moral residue afterwards: he or she 
would feel remorse or guilt about not performing A2. Furthermore, 
most people would expect him or her to feel these negative 
emotions. This fact suggests that another moral principle 
prescribing A2 applies to the situation, making a moral demand 
on the moral agent. The moral residue thus suggests that 
contrary to Steiner’s argument, a moral principle other than the 
new moral principle applies to the situation.  
 
6.3. Argument from Intentions 
 Another argument against the existence of moral dilemmas is 
that from intentions. This argument is inspired by the 
traditional Catholic doctrine of double effect, according to 
which a moral agent does not violate a moral principle just 
because he or she causes harm. For example, a moral agent does 
not violate a moral principle if he or she tries to help someone 
but harms him or her by accident or mistake. A moral agent, 
however, does violate a moral principle if he or she causes harm 
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intentionally. And there is another way to violate a moral 
principle: even if a moral agent does not intend to cause any 
harm, he or she violates a moral principle by knowingly causing 
a harm that is disproportionate to or greater than any benefit 
that he or she causes. Thus, a moral agent violates a moral 
principle if (1) he or she causes harm intentionally, or (2) he 
or she knowingly causes harm that is greater than or 
disproportionate to any benefit that is gained. Clause (1) is 
called the principle of intentionality, and clause (2) is called 
the principle of proportionality.  
 This doctrine seems to rule out moral dilemmas because it 
leaves a moral agent with some way to avoid violating both 
clauses. In any apparent moral dilemma, at least one of the 
harms is not greater than the other. Thus, there is always at 
least one alternative that does not cause greater harm. If 
choosing this alternative does not violate the principle of 
intentionality, then it appears that he or she can escape a 
moral dilemma. Consider the case of a moral agent making two 
promises to people that are identically situated in any morally 
relevant sense. Yet the moral agent is unable keep both promises. 
Suppose that the moral agent breaks one of the promises, harming 
one of the promisees. This harm would not be greater than the 
harm that the moral agent would cause by breaking the other 
promise, thus satisfying the principle of proportionality. If 
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the moral agent does not cause the harm intentionally, then he 
or she does not violate any moral principle according to the 
doctrine of double effect.   
 My objection to the argument from the doctrine of double 
effect is that it is vulnerable to the argument from 
incomparability of values. Nagel, for example, says that there 
is a fundamental division between personal and impersonal 
viewpoints, making comparison between them impossible. In 
particular, there is a formal contrast between rights, 
obligations, and private commitments, on the one hand, and 
utility and perfectionistic ends, on the other. For example, 
one’s reason for keeping one’s own promises is very different 
from one’s reason for wanting other people to keep theirs. One 
does not feel bound to keep one’s promises or to look after 
one’s children because it would be a good thing, impersonally 
considered. Rather, a more personal outlook is involved: it is 
one’s own relation to other people, or to the institution, or to 
the community, that moves him or her. By contrast, the claims of 
utility or perfectionistic ends are impersonal or outcome-
centered: they concern what happens rather than what one does.  
 Nagel says that the division between personal and 
impersonal viewpoints is so basic that it renders implausible 
any reductive unification. The division comes from two different 
points of view, fundamentally irreducible to a common basis. 
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When these two different points of view entail inconsistent 
actions, a moral dilemma arises. 
 When a moral dilemma arises from an incomparability of 
values, one is not able to apply the principle of 
proportionality. One cannot compare harm caused by violating a 
moral principle represented by a personal viewpoint with harm 
caused by violating a moral principle represented by an 
impersonal viewpoint. Yet the principle of proportionality 
assumes that these different harms are comparable to each other. 
If a source of moral dilemmas is the comparability of values, 
one cannot deny the existence of moral dilemmas based on the 
doctrine of double effect.  
 Sinnott-Armstrong (1988) raises another difficulty with the 
doctrine of double effect. He says that it is difficult to 
clarify the principle of intentionality. One account of the 
principle of intentionality might be that when a moral agent 
acts with a bad ultimate goal, purpose, or end, he or she 
violates the principle. For example, suppose that the moral 
agent has caused one person harm while pursuing the ultimate 
goal of avoiding another harm. Since this goal is not bad, one 
might then say that he or she satisfies the principle of 
intentionality. Sinnott-Armstrong says, however, that this 
account of the principle of intentionality is subject to 
counter-examples. Consider reckless driving. The driver’s goal 
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is only to enjoy driving or to have fun. So the driver appears 
to satisfy the principle of intentionality. Yet, the driver does 
seem to violate some moral principle - the moral principle of 
not endangering innocent people’s lives. This example suggests 
that the moral agent’s ultimate goal may not be the proper 
account of the principle of intentionality.  
 Another account of the principle of intentionality might be 
that a moral agent violates the principle of intentionality when 
he or she knowingly causes harm because doing so is either an 
end or a means to his or her end. Consider a terror bomber who 
bombs civilians in order to destroy the morale of the enemy. The 
terror bomber uses civilians’ deaths as a means to his end, so 
he violates the principle of intentionality: he knowingly causes 
harm to civilians. In contrast, consider a tactical bomber who 
bombs a munitions factory. He might know that his bombs will 
kill civilians that live close by, but he does not violate the 
principle of intentionality; their deaths are not a means of 
destroying the factory. Therefore, if there is always one 
alternative where knowingly causing harm is neither a means nor 
an end, this account of the principle of intentionality might 
rule out the existence of moral dilemmas.   
Sinnott-Armstrong, however, points to the difficulty of 
relating the idea of a means with the principle of 
intentionality. Using a means as a notion of intentionality 
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suggests that, for instance, the abortion method of craniotomy 
violates the principle of intentionality. This method involves 
crushing the fetus’ skull as a means to save the mother. The 
means, then, involves knowingly causing harm to fetus. On the 
other hand, say that because womb is cancerous, the abortion 
method of hysterectomy is employed, opening the mother’s uterus 
through an abdominal incision and removing the fetus. The 
hysterectomy method does not violate the principle of 
intentionality because the means does not involve knowingly 
causing harm to the fetus. Yet, in some sense, the difference 
between methods is not morally significant. It appears that a 
moral principle is violated in both cases because the fetus is 
killed. The difficulty of clarifying the principle of 
intentionality suggests that the doctrine of double effect may 
not be a promising way to deny the existence of moral dilemmas.  
   
6.4. Argument from Non-action-guiding Evaluations 
 Michael Stocker (1987) makes another argument against moral 
dilemmas. He says that moral dilemmas pose a difficulty for an 
ethical theory: if moral dilemmas exist, ethics would be 
impractical or incomplete. They would be impractical by telling 
a moral agent to follow all the conflicting moral principles; 
they would be incomplete by not telling a moral agent which 
moral principle to follow. Yet, there is disagreement over what 
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this difficulty implies. Some say that ethics must be 
impractical or incomplete, while others deny the very existence 
of moral dilemmas. 
 Stocker says that one important source of the disagreement 
lies in how one views an ethical theory. One often views an 
ethical theory as exclusively concerned with action-guiding 
evaluations; it has no way of understanding a conflict except in 
terms of conflicting action-guiding evaluations. One thus seems 
forced either to reject a conflict or to accept impracticality 
or incompleteness.   
 Stocker says that there exists an alternative view that 
does not limit the theory’s concerns to action-guiding 
evaluations. It recognizes that not all action evaluations are 
action-guiding, as many conflicts are between action-guiding and 
non-action-guiding evaluations. 
 According to Stoker, there are situations where even if one 
cannot perform an action, it can still be true that one ought to 
do it. This becomes clear in a situation where one is culpable 
for his or her inability. For example, it would be unreasonable 
to suggest that if one has squandered one’s money, then one no 
longer ought to repay one’s debts. If, however, one cannot 
replay the money now, his or her present action cannot be guided 
by ‘One ought to repay his or her debt now’. This “ought” 
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statement is true but non-action-guiding. Culpable inabilities, 
then, are a source of non-action-guiding evaluations.  
 According to Stocker, another source is found in an issue 
of whether ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This is the issue of whether 
‘ought’ depends on ‘will’ or on ‘should’. In other words, does 
what one ought to do depend on things that he or she will do or 
on things that he or she should do? This issue can be described 
as that of actualism vs. possibilism. 
 As illustration, suppose that as head of a department, I 
have a colleague that never manages to do his share of the 
tedious work — e.g., make arrangements for meetings. While he 
can do this, he never gets around to actually doing it. When he 
is given this task, the rooms are not booked, the refreshments 
are not ordered, and so on. Ought he try to make these 
arrangements? Ought I, as head, tell him to do his share? Or 
rather, ought he do something else, e.g., the next best thing 
that he can and will do? This might be a less burdensome 
departmental task, for instance, or completing a paper he is 
working on. 
 Possibilists hold that he ought to do his share and make 
the arrangements. They hold that “ought” is determined by what 
is possible for a moral agent to do, not what he or she will do. 
They also hold that “ought” addresses a person in one’s freedom 
and not in one’s facticity — especially not one’s culpable 
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facticity. The colleague will be engaging in blatant bad faith 
if he reasons that since he will not make the arrangements, he 
ought not agree to make them or he ought to do something else 
instead.  
 Actualists hold, on the other hand, that one should not let 
what is ideal override what is real and practical. On must face 
the facts and be realistic and aim at what can be achieved in 
the circumstances: to base ought judgments on what one can do 
rather than what one will do is to waste resources and miss 
opportunities.  
 In order to support his claim that conflicts exist between 
action-guiding and non-action-guiding evaluations, Stocker 
provides several examples. One example goes like this. Finishing 
the painting was the best thing that a person could then do and 
it was what he had an obligation to do. After all, he had 
accepted the commission. But finishing the painting had no 
significance at all, for his country was currently at war and he 
wanted to do something practical and useful. Although 
insignificance can ground an action-guiding evaluation, it does 
not do so here. The painter recognizes that the painting must be 
done. Yet he expresses a conflict between duty and significance. 
This conflict is between an action-guiding evaluation and a non-
action-guiding evaluation.  
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 One might object, however, that this example is not 
appropriate, for significance does not seem to have much to do 
with morality. The example does not appear to represent a 
conflict between moral issues. Stocker thus provides another 
example — one that is closer, he says, to what is usually seen 
as raising moral issues. Suppose that a professor has studied 
and taught philosophy in universities for many years. For 
various reasons, his students are unable to write well and are 
largely unable to understand philosophical texts of any real 
complexity. He finally realizes that he must suspend teaching 
philosophy and instead give time over to the remedial tasks of 
helping them read and write. 
 He may not doubt that this is what he must do, and he might 
resolutely do it. Yet, he experiences regrets and sorrow for his 
students, anger at what has left them so unprepared, and laments 
about whether this is what he has spent his life preparing for. 
The regret, sorrow, anger, and laments give expression to 
evaluations of what he must do. They show his opposition to it 
and a conflict over it. Even though his feelings express a 
conflict, they need not involve vacillation or uncertainty. They 
can simply be non-action-guiding evaluations of the act. 
 Another example is of a moral compromise. Suppose that in 
order to vote for the better political party, one endorses a 
platform containing some bad, or even immoral, policies. One may 
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be clear about what he or she ought to do. The alternative 
option may be so much worse that one does not see it as a real 
moral option at all. One might do what he or she ought to do 
with perfect resoluteness. Nonetheless, one can resent having to 
choose the option that he or she has chosen. Such resentment 
shows that a conflict exists between an action-guiding 
evaluation and a non-action-guiding evaluation of the act.  
 My objection to Stocker’s argument is that it does not 
eliminate the possibility of moral dilemmas. The fact that there 
are non-action-guiding “ought” statements or evaluations does 
not mean that moral dilemmas do not exist. What Stocker seems to 
show is that some conflicts are between action-guiding 
evaluations and non-action-guiding evaluations. To deny the 
existence of moral dilemmas, however, he needs to show is that 
action-guiding evaluations never conflict; but he fails to show 
this.  
 Furthermore, his examples of conflicts between action-
guiding evaluations and non-action guiding evaluations do not 
qualify as moral dilemmas, as defined in this essay. Moral 
dilemmas arise when two moral principles conflict and do not 
override each other. In the case of moral compromise discussed 
above, the conflicting moral principles may be described as “the 
moral principle of supporting the political cause that one 
believes in” and “the moral principle of supporting the 
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political party that one believes in.” The moral agent upholds 
the second moral principle with perfect resoluteness. The 
alternative option of supporting the first moral principle is 
much worse such that the moral agent does not see it as a real 
moral option at all. The second moral principle seems to 
override the first convincingly, disqualifying this example as a 
moral dilemma. Stocker’s argument thus identifies conflicts 
between action-guiding evaluations and non-action-guiding 
evaluations, but does not undermine the fact that moral dilemmas 
exist.  
 
6.5. Argument from the Distinction between Negative and Positive 
Moral Principles 
 Another argument against moral dilemmas is that from the 
distinction between negative and moral principles. According to 
this argument, all moral principles are negative. A moral 
principle is negative if it requires one not to take an action. 
If a moral theory includes only negative moral principles, 
though two moral principles apply to the same situation, a moral 
agent can fulfill both moral principles by doing nothing - 
thereby avoiding a moral dilemma. For example, if a moral agent 
is required not to lie and not to kill, he or she can fulfill 
both requirements by remaining silent.  
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 This argument, however, is vulnerable to the objection that 
there seem to be positive moral principles. For example, one is 
morally required to help out another in need. The proponents of 
the argument thus have to figure out ways to deny the existence 
of positive moral principles. Alternatively, the proponent must 
claim that if positive moral principles exist, they either do 
not conflict with one another or the positive moral principles 
are always overridden by the negative moral principles.  
 Sinnott-Armstrong (1988) raises objections to the argument 
from the distinction between negative and positive moral 
principles. He says that the distinction between negative and 
positive principles is not clear, for one can re-describe 
negative principles as positive principles and vice versa. For 
example, the positive principle of keeping a promise can be re-
described as the negative principle of not omitting what has 
been promised. Similarly, the positive principle of helping 
others in need can be re-described as the negative principle of 
not neglecting to help others in need. 
 In order to clarify the distinction, the proponents of the 
argument might use bodily movement to identify the distinction. 
The proponents might say that a moral principle is negative if 
it is fulfilled by anyone who does not move his or her body, and 
that a moral principle is positive if it cannot be performed 
without bodily movement. The proponents can then argue that 
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whenever negative moral principles conflict, one can avoid it by 
not moving his or her body.   
 Sinnott-Armstrong says, however, that this approach is not 
promising. First, sitting still is often doing something. 
Suppose an enemy knocks on a man’s door and asks if his wife is 
home. The husband knows that his wife is home, and the enemy 
will kill her if he finds her. In this case, the moral principle 
of not lying conflicts with the moral principle of not 
endangering other’s life. Unfortunately, he cannot fulfill both 
principles; if he remains silent, the enemy will infer that she 
is home. Not to move his mouth amounts to revealing her location, 
which violates one of the moral principles.  
 Another problem with the argument is that there are 
situations where a moral agent is unable to do nothing. For 
example, the negative moral principle requires Sophie not to 
choose either child to be killed. She can physically remain 
silent and do nothing. Yet, if she does not choose a child, both 
will be killed. Thus morally, she cannot refuse to choose either 
child. This case suggests that a moral dilemma can arise even 
though both moral principles are negative.  
 Finally, even if one grants that negative moral principles 
never conflict, the approach does not rule out conflicts between 
negative and positive moral principles. For example, the 
negative moral principle of not lying may conflict with the 
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positive moral principle of keeping a promise. The opponents 
might try to avoid such conflicts by claiming the non-existence 
of positive moral principles. This claim, however, is difficult 
to support. For example, most would say that parents are morally 
responsible for taking care of their children. The moral 
principle of promise-keeping is positive when one promises to do 
an act of some kind. It is difficult to deny that these moral 
principles are positive: they have moral relevance, and cannot 
be fulfilled without bodily movement.
23
  
 
Chapter 7. Moral Dilemmas and Kant’s Ethics 
Thus far, I have defended the view that moral dilemmas 
exist. In this chapter, I draw out the implications of the 
existence of moral dilemmas for Kant’s ethical theory. The 
primary formulation of Kant's ethics is the categorical 
                                                          
23
 Jeffrey Blustein suggests another argument against moral dilemmas: moral 
dilemmas are cases of incomplete information, defective rational processing, 
and ignorance. Under ideal conditions, it would be clear which moral 
principle takes precedence. My reply is that one can make a distinction 
between the epistemic issue and the metaphysical issue. Due to his or her 
epistemic limitation, a moral agent may not able to know for certain that a 
particular moral conflict that he or she faces is a moral dilemma. The 
epistemic limitation of a moral agent, however, does not mean that moral 
dilemmas do not exist. The argument from moral residue, the argument from the 
incomparable values, and the argument from symmetry indicate that moral 
dilemmas are metaphysically possible. If they are metaphysically possible, 
then it is very likely that they actually exist. Given the complexities of 
moral life and the interactions among different moral principles, it is very 
likely that there are actual cases where moral principles do not override 
each other.  
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imperative.
24
 Kant makes a distinction between a categorical 
imperative and a hypothetical one. A hypothetical imperative is 
one that a moral agent must obey if he or she wants to achieve 
some end or goal. “Go to see the doctor” is a hypothetical 
imperative because one is only obliged to obey it if he or she 
wants to get well. A categorical imperative, on the other hand, 
binds a moral agent regardless of his or her end or goal. For 
example, one has a duty not to lie regardless of circumstances 
and even if it is in his or her interest to do so. A categorical 
imperative is morally binding because it is based on reason 
rather than contingent facts about a moral agent. Unlike with a 
hypothetical imperative, a moral agent cannot opt-out of the 
categorical imperative because he or she cannot opt-out of being 
a rational being. A moral agent owes a duty to rationality by 
virtue of being a rational agent. 
Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative 
states that one must act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which one can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law. This formulation in effect summarizes a decision 
procedure for moral reasoning. First, formulate a maxim that 
enshrines one’s reason for acting as one proposes. Second, 
recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all 
                                                          
24 Robert Johnson provides an overview of Kant’s theory of ethics. 
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rational agents. Third, consider whether one’s maxim is even 
conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. Fourth, 
if it is, ask oneself whether one could rationally will to act 
on one’s own maxim in such a world. If one could, then one’s 
action is morally permissible. 
If one’s maxim fails the third step, one has a “perfect” 
duty, admitting no exception in favor of inclination to refrain 
from acting on it. If one’s maxim fails the fourth step, one has 
an “imperfect duty” requiring one to pursue a policy that can 
admit of such exceptions. If one’s maxim passes all four steps, 
acting on it is morally permissible.  
One can understand the difference in duties as follows. A 
perfect duty comes in the form, “One must never (or always) act 
in particular way to the fullest extent possible.” An imperfect 
duty, since it enjoins the pursuit of an end, comes in the form, 
“One must sometimes and to some extent act in a particular way.” 
For example, the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future 
unhappiness does not pass the third step, the contradiction in 
conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of 
committing suicide to avoid unhappiness to the full extent 
possible. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in 
pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception 
test, but fails the contradiction in the will test. Hence, one 
has a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others. 
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Kant says that moral duties can be distinguished between 
moral duties toward ourselves and those toward others. Thus, 
together with the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties, one can divide Kant’s moral duties into four categories: 
perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, 
imperfect duties toward ourselves, and imperfect duties toward 
others. For example, to refrain from suicide is a perfect duty 
toward oneself; to refrain from making a false promise is a 
perfect duty toward others; to develop one's talents is an 
imperfect duty toward oneself; and to contribute to the 
happiness of others is an imperfect duty toward others.  
As an illustration of how a categorical imperative is 
applied, Kant considers a case where one makes a false promise 
with no intention of keeping it. If the maxim of this act was 
universalized, it would be that “all rational agents could make 
false promises to deceive others.” In a world where the maxim 
was universalized, however, no one would trust any promises made, 
so the idea of a promise would become meaningless. The maxim 
would be self-contradictory because, when universalized, 
promises cease to be meaningful. The act of false promise is 
thus immoral: one cannot conceive of a world where this maxim is 
universalized. 
An act can also be immoral if it creates a contradiction in 
the will when universalized. A contradiction in will does not 
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mean a logical contradiction. Rather, it leads to a state of 
affairs that no rational being would desire. For example, when 
universalized, the maxim of “I will not contribute to others’ 
well-being” produces a contradiction in the will. A world where 
no one gives to charity would be undesirable for a rational 
moral agent who acts by the maxim. 
 Based on this background information on Kant’s ethical 
theory, Kant (1987) denies that moral dilemmas exist. Gowans 
(1987) says that for Kant, moral rules are unconditional 
imperatives that declare certain actions either morally 
necessary or morally impossible. This means that from the point 
of view of practical reason, a moral agent either must or must 
not perform them. Actions that are neither morally necessary nor 
morally impossible are morally permissible. These three 
categories — the necessary, the impossible, and the permissible 
— are exclusive and exhaustive: every action falls into one and 
only one. Hence, it is incoherent to suppose that an action 
could be both necessary and impossible or that two actions could 
both be necessary when doing one prevents doing the other. If it 
is a duty that a moral agent perform a certain action, then it 
cannot also be a duty that the same agent perform another action 
incompatible with it. 
The most frequently cited passage supporting Kant’s denial 
of moral dilemmas is as follows: 
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A conflict of duties would be a relation of duties in 
which one of them would annul the other (wholly or in 
part). But a conflict of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable. For the concepts of duty and obligation 
as such express the objective practical necessity of 
certain actions, and two conflicting rules cannot both 
be necessary at the same time: if it is our duty to 
act according to one of these rules, then to act 
according to the opposite one is not our duty and is 
even contrary to duty. But there can, it is true, be 
two grounds of obligation both present in one agent 
and in the rule he lays down for himself. In this case 
one or the other of these grounds is not sufficient to 
oblige him and is therefore not a duty. When two such 
grounds conflict with each other, practical philosophy 
says, not that the stronger obligation takes 
precedence, but that the stronger ground of obligation 
prevails. (pp. 39-40) 
 
In this passage, Kant says that a moral agent can be subject to 
competing “grounds of obligation.” That is, he or she may 
recognize two moral considerations, each of which would be 
sufficient to impose upon him a duty. In cases where both 
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grounds of obligation are present, however, it is inconceivable 
that the moral agent could have a duty stemming from each ground 
of obligation. Given the objective practical necessity expressed 
by the concept of duty, it must be the case that his or her duty 
stems from the stronger ground of obligation. No case exists 
where he or she has a duty to perform and to abstain from 
performing one and the same action. In cases of competing 
grounds of obligation, one such ground is sufficient to 
constitute his or her duty.  
Martha Nussbaum (1985) explains why the idea of grounds of 
duties is necessary for Kant’s ethics. For Kant, the requirement 
that objective practical rules be consistent in every situation 
overrides one’s intuitive feeling that a genuine conflict of 
duties exists. It may appear to one that duties conflict. But 
this conflict is impossible since the very concepts of duty and 
practical law rule out inconsistency. One must therefore find a 
way of describing the apparent conflict of duties. Since at most 
one of the conflicting claims can be a genuine duty, one should 
call the other a ground of duty. When the stronger ground 
prevails, one sees that this alone is one’s duty. The 
conflicting ground does not simply lose out but also vacates the 
field. To say anything else would be, for Kant, to weaken the 
strong conceptual bonds between duty and practical necessity, 
and between both and logical consistency.   
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  A related question naturally arises concerning Kant’s view 
on moral dilemmas — when the grounds of duties conflict, how can 
a moral agent figure out which ground prevails? Onora O’Neill 
(1975) attempts to provide the answer. She says that one can 
apply Kant’s contradiction in conception test to determine which 
ground of duty is stronger. When doing so, one often finds 
greater difficulty in universalizing one ground of duty than the 
other.  
O’Neill considers the case of lying to save the life of a 
would-be murderer’s intended victim. The would-be murderer asks 
the householder where his intended victim is and reveals his 
intentions. The housekeeper knows the victim’s whereabouts and 
can choose between lying to mislead the murderer or directing 
him to his victim. The householder thus must choose between: 
 
1. To tell the truth even if it means allowing (omitting to 
prevent) death. 
2. To prevent a death even if it means telling a lie.  
 
If one universalizes these maxims, the following statements 
hold: 
    
3. Everyone will tell the truth even when it means allowing 
deaths. 
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4. Everyone will prevent deaths even when it means telling 
lies. 
 
O’Neill says that it is possible without contradiction to intend 
both 1 and 3 hold as a law of nature. It is also possible to 
intend both 2 and 4 hold as a law of nature. But there is a 
difference between the two cases. In the case of 2 and 4, 
simultaneous intending produces no difficulties. No serious 
breakdown of trust or cooperation with others will arise if one 
knows that others will lie when it is required to save a life. 
But in the case of simultaneously intending 1 and 3, a breakdown 
of trust and cooperation will arise. If one knows that others 
will not tell a lie even to save a life, then one can hardly 
trust others to prevent death in any situation of potential 
danger. Intending 1 and 3 thus commits a moral agent to 
intending a situation which tends toward a Hobbesian state of 
nature, impeding and preventing one’s plans of action. One’s 
cooperation with others would have to be carefully limited in 
such a situation. This difference in results may be the basis 
for calling 2 and 4 the stronger ground of obligation. 
 O’Neill’s argument, however, is not satisfactory. She 
provides no textual evidence suggesting that Kant believes what 
she says about how a moral agent should resolve conflicting 
grounds of duties. Kant talks about the contradiction in 
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conception and the contradiction in will in applying the 
categorical imperative to particular cases. He does not, 
however, explicitly suggest that a moral agent should reject the 
ground of duty because it tends toward the Hobbesian state of 
nature. Furthermore, O’Neill’s test does not resolve all cases 
of conflicting grounds of duties. Consider the case of Sartre’s 
student. One might say that the student has in mind the 
following pair of maxims: 
 
5. I will honor my family obligations even if it means not 
advancing my country’s interests.  
6. I will advance my country’s interests even if it means 
not honoring my family obligations. 
 
It is possible without contradiction to intend both 5 and 6 hold 
as a law of nature. It is difficult to say, however, which 
situation characterized by each maxim leads to a collapse into a 
Hobbesian state of nature. Each one may have some impact on 
trust or cooperation among people, but it is not clear in which 
situation the more severe breakdown of trust or cooperation with 
others tends to arise. This difficulty suggests the problem with 
O’Neill’s test. 25   It also hints at the possibility of moral 
                                                          
25 Nell says that her test is not to be found in Kant’s works, but it derives 
from them. Her test has the merits of filling a gap in Kant’s theory of right 
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dilemmas. Kant says when two grounds to duties conflict, one of 
them must prevail to become a real duty. Two grounds of duties 
cannot remain in a state of conflict if they involve moral 
considerations. Given the objective practical necessity 
expressed by the concept of duty, it must be the case that there 
exists the stronger ground of duty, which a moral agent must 
follow. O’Neill’s test shows that there are situations where a 
moral agent has difficulty deciding which competing grounds of 
duties prevail. In these situations, one cannot be sure what his 
or her real duties are; this suggests that moral dilemmas exist.  
   Given that moral dilemmas exist, what implication does 
their existence have on Kant’s moral theory? The answer depends 
on whether a moral agent faces perfect duties or imperfect 
duties. Mary J. Gregor (1963) explains the distinction. She says 
that Kant’s ethics is very closely modelled upon the legal 
structure of the state. Many of one’s duties are jurisdical 
duties: their principles are established by law and they are 
only indirectly ethical. It is only after analyzing Kant’s 
doctrine of imperfect duties that one can justly estimate the 
character of his ethics, as distinguished from his philosophy of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decisions and of yielding results which confirm one’s intuitions. In other 
words, it generally accounts stronger those grounds of obligation which one 
thinks of being so, and weaker those grounds of obligation which one thinks 
of as relatively trivial. But she admits that it seems to fail to indicate 
any priority between grounds of obligation which one probably regards as 
pressing claims of similar urgency.  
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law. Imperfect duties are directly ethical, and Kant’s ethics is 
primarily a study of these ethics.  
  Gregor says that the distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duty is one that Kant has worked out gradually. The 
complex doctrine in the Metaphysics of Morals stands in sharp 
contrast with the simple and clear-cut distinction that he draws 
in his early lectures on ethics.  
  Since law is the system of duties to which one can be 
externally compelled, and ethics is the system of duties to 
which only self-constraint is possible, the simplest distinction 
between perfect and imperfect duty would be to equate the first 
with juridical duty and the second with ethical duty. Kant 
proposes this distinction in his lectures on ethics. External 
obligation is necessitation through the will of another, and 
interior obligation is necessitation through one’s own will. 
Therefore, interior obligations are imperfect because one cannot 
be compelled by others to fulfill them, and external obligations 
are perfect because one can be so compelled.   
  Yet this simple distinction may be unable to account for 
all the relevant facts. In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant rejects this distinction through his recognition 
that there are perfect duties to oneself. Having made the 
reservation that the division of perfect and imperfect duties 
belongs properly to Metaphysics of Morals, he says that his 
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understanding of perfect duty is not commonly adopted in the 
schools. According to Kant, he understands perfect duty as one 
which allows no exceptions in the inclination, and so he 
recognizes among perfect duties not only outer ones but also 
inner ones. Since one cannot be compelled by others to fulfill 
these perfect duties to ourselves, Kant’s recognition of such 
duties clearly implies that his own principle of division must 
differ from that put forward in Doctrine of Virtues. 
  In Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discards the 
commonly accepted division between perfect and imperfect duty; 
instead, he favors a distinction according to which perfect duty 
permits neither arbitrary exceptions nor exceptions in favor of 
the inclinations, and imperfect duty, presumably, does permit 
such exceptions.  
  In Metaphysics of Morals, however, Kant does not return to 
the traditional distinction in terms of the possibility or 
impossibility of external compulsion. Neither does he 
consistently work out the implications sketched in Groundwork of 
Metaphysics of Morals. In Groundwork and the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant says that imperfect duties consist in the adoption 
of certain ends, rather than in determining actions. Imperfect 
duties accordingly leave latitude between one’s aims and one’s 
actions in realization of those aims.  
  Gowans (1987) provides a simpler interpretation of the 
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distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties 
prescribe or prohibit all instances of specific kinds of action. 
For this reason, there is no latitude in deciding how to fulfill 
these duties. This is not the case with imperfect duties, 
however. These duties prescribe not every instance of a specific 
kind of action but rather an unspecific pursuit of ends. These 
duties thus allow some latitude in how to perform them. Kant 
says that the imperfect duties “cannot specify precisely what 
and how much one’s actions should do toward the obligatory end” 
(p. 45).  
  Kant believes that it is perfect duties that cannot 
conflict because they make all instances of specific kinds of 
action necessary. Since imperfect duties do not make any 
particular action necessary, there is no reason to deny that 
these duties do conflict in the sense that on a particular 
occasion, pursuing one end (e.g., the happiness of others) may 
mean not pursuing another (e.g., the development of one’s 
talent). When this happens, a moral agent may act as he or she 
pleases, as long as he or she does not abandon an imperfect duty 
altogether.   
  Following the distinction explained by Gowans, consider the 
conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty. Suppose 
that the moral principle of promise-keeping prompts a moral 
agent to meet his or her friend, while the moral principle of 
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beneficence prescribes him or her to help out a stranger in need 
of help. According to Kant, the former is a perfect duty and the 
latter an imperfect duty. Since the perfect duty overrides the 
imperfect duty, the moral agent ought to keep his or her 
promise. So this case is resolvable under Kant’s theory of 
ethics and would not be treated as a moral dilemma.  
 On the other hand, suppose that a moral agent makes 
promises to two people and later finds out that he or she cannot 
keep both. The principle of promise-keeping is a perfect duty 
for Kant. Yet in this case, the principle entails incompatible 
actions and a moral agent is bound to violate it. This is the 
very situation that Kant considers inconceivable: the moral 
rules declare actions that are both necessary and incompatible 
with each other. A conflict between perfect duties thus poses a 
real problem for Kant’s ethics. The conflict cannot be resolved 
by Kant’s theory and, contrary to Kant’s claims, should be 
treated as a dilemma. Thus, the existence of moral dilemmas 
appears inconsistent with Kant’s ethics.  
  
Chapter 8. Moral Dilemmas and Utilitarianism 
 In this chapter, I discuss the implication of moral 
dilemmas for utilitarianism. In particular, I focus on Mill 
(1979/1861)’s theory of utilitarianism. In addition to serving 
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as a major advocate of utilitarianism, Mill also expresses his 
views of moral conflicts.  
What kind of utilitarian is Mill? Is he an act-utilitarian 
or a rule utilitarian? How does he resolve moral conflicts 
between moral principles? Robert Hoag (1983) attempts to provide 
answers. Mill discusses the cases of moral conflicts in Chapters 
II and V of Utilitarianism. He characterizes these cases as 
involving “conflicting obligations” or “conflicting rights and 
duties,” and sometimes as involving conflicting moral rules, 
laws, maxims, or secondary principles. He also uses these 
characterizations interchangeably. So, one can describe the 
cases of moral conflict in terms of conflicting moral rules.  
According to Mill, the nature of human affairs is so 
complicated that any one moral rule cannot be always binding. 
Rather, a moral agent encounters situations where different 
moral rules appear to entail incompatible actions. He writes, 
 
It is not the fault of any creed, but of the 
complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of 
conduct cannot be so framed as to require no 
exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can 
safely be laid down as either always obligatory or 
always condemnable . . . There exists no moral system 
under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of 
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conflicting obligation. These are real difficulties, 
the knotty points both in the theory of ethics and in 
the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. (p. 
25) 
 
Mill holds that moral conflicts are resolved by direct appeal to 
considerations of utility. The need to deal with the cases of 
moral conflict arises for all moral theories, but according to 
him, utilitarianism resolves such cases better than any other 
moral theory. He writes, 
 
If utility is the ultimate source of moral 
obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between 
them when their demands are incompatible. Though the 
application of the standard may be difficult, it is 
better than none at all; while in other systems, the 
moral laws all claiming independent authority, there 
is no common umpire entitled to interfere with them: 
their claim to precedence one over another rest on 
little better than sophistry, and unless determined, 
as they generally are, by the unacknowledged influence 
of considerations of utility, afford a free scope for 
the action of personal desires and partialities. (p. 
26)  
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Mill indicates that a distinct advantage of utilitarianism 
consists in permitting direct appeal to the first moral 
principle in order to resolve moral conflicts. His first 
principle, the principle of utility, holds that utility is the 
ultimately desirable end. A moral conflict is thus resolved by 
assessing the utilities of different courses of action.  
According to Hoag, one can distinguish three plausible 
procedures for resolving the moral conflicts for Mill. These 
procedures are distinct in that the specific action they would 
prescribe is not identical for all circumstances of moral 
conflict: 
 
(I) Apply the principle of utility only to the conflicting 
moral rules and consider only the relative general 
observance-utilities of those rules. An agent ought to 
act in conformity with the rule, the general observance 
of which produces more utilities than the general 
observance of any other applicable rule.  
 
(II) Apply the principle of utility directly to particular 
acts and consider the relative simple utilities of all 
alternative acts. The agent ought to perform the 
particular act which maximizes utilities. 
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(III) Apply the principle of utility directly to particular 
acts and consider the relative simple utilities of acts 
where each alternative considered is an act in conformity 
with at least one of the applicable rules. Given this 
restricted set of alternatives, the agent ought to 
perform the particular act which maximizes utilities. 
 
 Hoag argues that procedure (III) is the one that Mill 
adopts to resolve moral conflicts. In Chapter V of 
Utilitarianism, Mill indicates how his moral theory resolves a 
case of conflicting moral rules. The case illustrates a conflict 
between the rule of justice and another moral rule: 
 
It appears from what has been said that justice is a 
name for certain moral requirements which, regarded 
collectively, stand higher in the scale of social 
utility, and are therefore of more paramount 
obligation, than any others, though particular cases 
may occur in which some other social duty is so 
important as to overrule any one of the general maxims 
of justice. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be 
allowable, but a duty, to steal or take by force the 
necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap and compel to 
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officiate the only qualified medical practitioner. 
(pp. 63-64) 
 
In this example, incompatible actions are entailed by two moral 
rules: a moral rule to render aid and a moral rule of justice 
regarding property rights to food and medicine. Mill says that a 
moral agent should resolve this conflict by following the moral 
rule to render aid.  
Mill’s resolution of the conflict suggests that one of the 
procedures should be eliminated as a correct interpretation of 
Mill’s view. Procedure (I) states that the principle of utility 
is to be applied only to the conflicting moral rules and that 
the agent ought to act in conformity with the rule that has the 
highest utilities. Mill clearly holds that adherence to the rule 
of justice brings about the highest utilities: 
 
Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules 
which concern the essentials of well-being more 
nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, 
than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the 
notion which we have found to be of the essence of the 
idea of justice — that of a right residing in an 
individual — implies and testifies to this more 
binding obligation. The moral rules which forbid 
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mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never 
forget to include a wrongful interference with each 
other’s freedom) are more vital to human well-being 
than any maxims, however important, which only point 
out the best mode of managing some department of human 
affairs. (p. 59) 
 
Thus, concerning Mill’s example of a moral conflict, the 
utilities of following the rule of justice exceed those of 
following the rule to render aid. If he were committed to 
procedure (I), he would have to suggest that the agent ought to 
follow the rule of justice and not to render aid. Since he 
instead suggests that the moral agent ought to render aid, 
procedure (I) is not a proper interpretation of Mill’s view. 
Mill’s resolution of the conflict indicates that the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular case are relevant in resolving 
the conflict. But he does not indicate whether procedure (II) or 
procedure (III) is the correct one. Procedure (II) states that 
the agent ought to perform the act that maximizes utilities in 
the particular circumstances. In Mill’s example, the maximally 
utilitarian alternative would likely be to render aid. Similar 
reasoning suggests that procedure (III) would also prescribe 
rendering aid; among the acts that are in conformity with at 
least one of the applicable rules, the maximally utilitarian 
 
 
131 
 
alternative would be to render aid. Therefore, Mill’s resolution 
of the case does not provide conclusive evidence in favor of 
procedure (II) or procedure (III). 
Hoag maintains, however, that procedure (III) is the more 
plausible interpretation of Mill’s view. In his brief 
discussions of unequivocal cases of conflicting moral rules, 
Mill says that in such cases “utility may be invoked to decide 
between them” (p. 26). That is, whatever Mill adopts as a 
procedure for resolving moral conflicts by appeal to utilities, 
the resolution apparently involves deciding between the 
applicable moral rules. Procedure (II) requires that the agent 
perform the particular act which maximizes utilities. In some 
circumstances, however, the act that maximizes utilities may not 
be in conformity with any of the applicable moral rules. Since 
Procedure (II) does not reference applicable moral rules, Hoag 
says, Procedure (III) is the preferred interpretation of Mill’s 
view. 
If Mill were committed to procedure (II), then in 
circumstances where the maximally utilitarian alternative is not 
in conformity with any applicable moral rule, Mill’s theory 
would be committed to the implausible view of prescribing the 
moral agent to ignore all the applicable moral rules in favor of 
merely expedient or prudent behavior. On the other hand, if Mill 
were committed to procedure (III), then the alternatives to be 
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considered would always be limited by the applicable moral 
rules. Mill would then not prescribe ignoring all the applicable 
moral rules in circumstances of moral conflict.  
 Hoag’s interpretation makes Mill neither a committed rule-
utilitarian nor an act-utilitarian. David Lyons (1976) supports 
this interpretation. He says that unlike mainstream utilitarian 
theories, Mill’s theory is preoccupied neither with acts nor 
rules. Rather, Mill is primarily concerned with the end of 
happiness, and with whatever means to best achieve that end. All 
such means may be properly judged by reference to that end. For 
Mill, the rules are not subordinated to judgments of particular 
acts, and vice versa.  
 Lyons notes, for example, that Mill shares the spirit of 
rule-utilitarianism in his refusal to require that each act 
maximize utilities. Although Mill’s theory is predicated on the 
end of happiness, it does not collapse into act-utilitarianism. 
For Mill, the rules mean informal and generally accepted 
standards for minimally acceptable behavior. And their existence 
is a matter of general knowledge before the acts they concern 
are performed. The rules function prospectively as moral 
coercions and the negative consequences follow if people break 
them. These rules have costs associated with implementing them, 
and under Mill’s theory, there are no moral obligations unless 
corresponding social rules are justified on utilitarian grounds. 
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In more circumstances than under act-utilitarianism, therefore, 
the social rules set limits to conduct without telling a moral 
agent what to do.  
 What implication does the existence of moral dilemmas have 
on Mill’s utilitarianism? Mill does not explicitly deny the 
existence of moral dilemmas. His example of moral conflict 
involves one moral rule overriding the other: the moral rule to 
render aid overrides the moral rule of justice regarding 
property rights to food and medicine. Presumably, an act to 
follow the rule to render aid by saving a life produces more 
utilities that the act to adhere to the rule of justice by not 
stealing necessary foods or medicines.  
 Mill does not explicitly discuss the case where each 
alternative produces an equal amount of utilities. It is easily 
conceivable, however, that such a case exists. A symmetric case 
provides a good example. Keeping one promise produces the same 
amount of utilities as keeping the other where no relevant 
differences exist between the promises. Choosing to save one 
child produces the same amount of utilities as choosing to save 
the other where no relevant differences exist between them. In 
these cases, Mill’s utilitarianism provides no guidance to 
action. From the utilitarian perspective, one alternative seems 
as good as the other. 
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 Does this fact undermine Mill’s utilitarianism as a theory 
of ethics? It shows that Mill’s utilitarianism is not always 
uniquely-action guiding. Yet, as discussed earlier, this fact 
alone does not automatically render a moral theory defective. A 
moral theory’s ability to perform its action-guiding function 
comes in degrees. How much the existence of moral dilemmas 
undermines Mill’s utilitarianism depends on prevalence and 
frequency of moral dilemmas. The existence of moral dilemmas 
would be damaging to Mill’s utilitarianism if a moral agent 
faces them constantly and hence is at a loss about what action 
to take. In this respect, Peter Railton (1996)’s comments are 
relevant. He writes,  
 
. . . if fundamental clashes of value and obligation 
were pervasive in daily life, such that moral 
principles seldom provided any definite guidance — 
except perhaps to license unremitting guilt for what 
one cannot avoid — there would be little prospect for 
the moral life as a source of allegiance or as a way of 
understanding oneself and one’s place in the world. 
Ordinary moral thought would seem to leave on abandoned, 
and one would have to plunge ahead on one’s own. (p. 
161) 
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 One might argue for pervasiveness of moral dilemmas based 
on the multiple roles that a moral agent occupies in society. 
McConnell (2009) distinguishes between general obligations and 
role-related obligations. General obligations are the moral 
requirements that an individual has because he or she is a moral 
agent. Examples include obligations not to kill, not to steal, 
and not to assault others. Each moral agent is bound by these 
requirements. By contrast, role-related obligations are the 
moral requirements that a moral agent has by virtue of his or 
her role, occupation, or position in society. For example, a 
lifeguard is required to save swimmers in distress, a doctor is 
required to hold a patent’s information in confidence, and a 
teacher is required to educate students. 
General obligations and role-related obligations can entail 
incompatible actions. When a doctor has a patient that is 
dangerous to others, the doctor’s general obligation to prevent 
harm to innocent persons may be inconsistent with his or her 
role-related obligation of confidentiality. Moreover, different 
role-related obligations can entail incompatible actions. For 
example, a doctor’s role-related obligations to patients may be 
inconsistent with the doctor’s role-related obligations as a 
medical researcher. Since a moral agent occupies multiple roles 
in society, he or she faces constant conflicting moral demands. 
This seems to suggest that utilitarianism would not be able to 
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adequately guide action. In too many cases, a moral agent would 
be pulled by different demands but utilitarianism cannot tell 
the moral agent what he or she ought to do.  
The fact that a moral agent occupies multiple roles in 
society, however, does not necessarily mean that he or she 
constantly faces moral dilemmas. Suppose that a person must take 
care of a fatally wounded patient as a doctor, must attend a 
conference as a hospital employee, and must attend her son’s 
birthday party as a parent. Suppose that she must take these 
actions at the same time but cannot do so. The situation, 
however, does not necessarily count as a moral dilemma as 
defined in this essay. A moral dilemma is a situation in which a 
moral agent is pulled in opposite directions by non-overridden 
moral principles — from the utilitarian perspective, it is a 
situation where a moral agent’s alternative actions produce the 
same amount of utilities. In the example, the utilities that the 
doctor would produce by attending the urgent patient seem be 
greater than those that he or she would produce by performing 
other roles. If so, the example does not count as a moral 
dilemma despite the multiple roles that the doctor plays. The 
same reasoning applies to other cases of conflicting roles. 
Therefore, the fact that a moral agent occupies multiple roles 
does not show that moral dilemmas are sufficiently pervasive to 
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undermine Mill’s utilitarianism as an effective action-guiding 
moral theory.  
Hence, the implication of moral dilemmas for Mill’s 
utilitarianism is that although it is not always uniquely 
action-guiding, it is not vitally undermined by the existence of 
moral dilemmas. There is no strong evidence to suggest that a 
moral agent faces moral dilemmas frequently or regularly despite 
the fact that he or she occupies multiple roles. Based on the 
utilities of alternative actions, a competent moral agent should 
be able figure out what he or she ought to do in most cases.  
   
Chapter 9. Moral Dilemmas and Virtue Ethics 
In this chapter, I discuss moral dilemmas as it relates to 
virtue ethics. Gary Watson (2003) says John Rawls (1971) views a 
moral theory as treating primarily three concepts: the concept 
of right, the concept of good, and the concept of moral worth. 
Of these concepts, Rawls takes the latter to be derivative: 
 
The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right 
and the good; the concept of a morally worthy person 
is, I believe, derive from them. The structure of an 
ethical theory is, then, largely determined by how it 
defines and connects these two basic notions. (p. 24) 
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Rawls thus recognizes two types of moral theories: those that 
define the right in terms of the good and those that do not. 
Rawls’ own theory illustrates the second type. An example of the 
first is classical utilitarianism, which defines right action as 
maximizing human happiness, which is taken to be the ultimate 
good.  
On either type of theory, the concept of moral worth is 
subordinated to one of the other concepts. For example, on Rawls’ 
theory, virtues are construed as strong and normally effective 
desires to act on the basic principles of right. Some versions 
of utilitarianism may accept this construal as well. 
Alternatively, they define virtues directly in terms of the good 
that certain traits or dispositions serve. 
Rawls’ classification corresponds to another division of 
moral theories — into teleological and deontological. These 
theories are ways of relating the two concepts that Rawls takes 
to be basic. In teleological views, the good is defined 
independently from the right, and then the right is defined as 
that which maximizes the good. Teleological theories are 
consequentialist. The contrasting conception is defined 
negatively as what is not teleological. As a result, all moral 
theories are construed as either consequentialist or 
deontological.  
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Watson disputes Rawls’ classification, however; Rawls’ 
classification does not accommodate virtue ethics such as those 
reflected in Aristotle’s views. According to Watson, Rawls 
considers Aristotle a teleologist. This classification would 
imply that Aristotle’s view is different from utilitarianism 
only in its conception of what is to be maximized. But this is 
very doubtful. For Aristotle, the virtuous person is not one who 
is out to maximize anything, nor is virtue itself defined as a 
state that tends to promote some independently definable good.  
This means that Aristotle’s view is deontological. Yet this 
interpretation is questionable as well, for a concept of good is 
primary in Aristotle’s view. Thus if teleological theories are 
those in which the concept of the good is primary, then 
Aristotle’s view is teleological. Watson says it is a mistake, 
however, to think that the only way of asserting the primacy of 
the good is consequentialism. One should recognize that a moral 
theory can be both teleological and non-consequentialist.  
Virtue ethics is a theory of this kind.  
Watson says that one can avoid this confusion by replacing 
Rawls’ distinction with the threefold distinction: an ethics of 
requirement, an ethics of consequences, and an ethics of virtue 
or character. This classification enables one to observe that 
while both ethics of consequences and ethics of virtue are 
teleological insofar as they are guided fundamentally by a 
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notion of the good, Aristotle is nonetheless closer to Kant than 
to Bentham on the question of consequentialism. It also enables 
one to consider what it means to take the concept of virtue as 
fundamental. 
Virtue ethics is distinct from other moral theories in that 
its standard of moral appraisal is the right character rather 
than the right action. Watson writes, 
 
An ethics of virtue is not a particular claim about 
the priority of virtue over right conduct but the 
moral general claim that action appraisal is 
derivative from the appraisal of character. To put it 
another way, the claim is that the basic moral facts 
are facts about the quality of character. Moral facts 
about action are ancillary to these. (p. 232)  
 
Thus, Watson believes that under virtue ethics, an action is 
determined right if it reflects the right character.  
Robert Louden (1984) also believes that what distinguishes 
virtue ethics from other moral theories is that its primary 
object of moral evaluation is not the act or its consequences, 
but rather the agent. He calls utilitarianism and deontology 
“act-centered ethics” and virtue ethics “agent-centered ethics.” 
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This basic difference leads to other differences between act-
centered ethics and agent-centered ethics. First, the two 
theories employ different models of practical reasoning. Act 
theorists are inclined to formulate decision procedures for 
making practical choices because they focus on discrete acts and 
moral quandaries. The agent, in their conceptual scheme, needs a 
guide for finding a way out of the quandary. Agent-centered 
ethics, on the other hand, focuses on long-term characteristic 
patterns of action; it does not focus on particular acts and 
choices. As a result, they do not describe practical reason as a 
rule-governed enterprise that can be applied to each case.  
Secondly, Louden says that act-centered ethics and agent-
centered ethics differ on moral motivation. For the 
deontological act theorist, the preferred motive for action is 
the idea of duty. For the utilitarian act theorist, it is the 
disposition to seek the happiness of people involved. But for 
the virtue theorist, the motivation is the virtues. For example, 
a moral agent who correctly acts from the disposition of charity 
does so not because it maximizes utility or because it is one’s 
duty. Rather, he or she does so out of a commitment to the value 
of charity.  
Michael Slote (2006) shares the view that what is 
distinctive about virtue ethics is its emphasis on right 
character. He distinguishes, however, between an agent-based 
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approach and an agent-focused approach. An agent-focused 
approach places a greater emphasis on right character than on 
right action, yet allows the status of action to be the object 
of moral appraisal. Slote believes that Aristotle’s ethical view 
represents an agent-focused view. For Aristotle, an action is 
noble or fine if a noble or virtuous individual performs it, and 
the virtuous individual is the measure of virtue in action. But 
Aristotle also allows that a properly guided or momentarily 
inspired person can perform a virtuous action even if he or she 
is not virtuous. Furthermore, Aristotle characterizes a virtuous 
person as someone who sees or perceives what is good or fine in 
any given situation. These remarks suggest that the ethical 
status of action does not derive entirely from a virtuous person. 
Rather, its status is treated as somewhat independent of the 
person.  
On the other hand, an agent-based approach views the 
ethical status of action as entirely derivative from the motives, 
dispositions, or inner life of the person who performs the 
action. Slote identifies two types of agent-basing virtues; 
inner strength and universal benevolence. The idea of inner 
strength originates from Plato, who relates morality of 
individual actions to the health and virtue of the soul and uses 
the images of a strong soul and a beautiful soul to convey the 
inner touchstone of all good human action. Slote believes that 
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this idea about inner strength can serve as the source for 
agent-based virtue ethics.  
According to Slote, another type of agent-based virtue is 
universal benevolence. Consider a person who gives money for the 
building of a hospital, but whose motivation is the desire to 
see his or her name on a building or the desire to get a 
reputation for generosity as a means to launch a political 
career. Utilitarians would typically evaluate his or her motives 
only in terms of their consequences. Morality as universal 
benevolence, however, evaluates his or her motives in terms of 
how well they approximate to universal benevolence. As a result, 
it treats such motivation as less than morally good.  
Given this background on virtue ethics, a question 
naturally arises: how does virtue ethics specify right action? 
In other words, what does virtue ethics say about how a moral 
agent ought to act in a given situation? Or does it say nothing 
about how a moral agent ought to act? 
Aristotle (2000) provides rough guidance to action. 
According to him, virtue is a condition intermediate between two 
other states, one involving excess and the other deficiency.
26
  
Virtue can thus be destroyed by deficiency or excess. In this 
respect, virtue is similar to technical skill. Every skilled 
                                                          
26 For an overview of Aristotle’s ethical theory, see Kraut (2014). 
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worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency and achieves a 
condition between the two extremes. Similarly, a courageous 
person judges that some dangers are worth facing and others are 
not, and experiences fear in an appropriate degree. On the other 
hand, a cowardly person flees every danger and experiences 
excessive fear, while a rash person engages every danger worth 
facing and experiences little or no fear. In this way, the 
virtue of courage lies between cowardice and rashness.  
Aristotle says, however, that not every action or emotion 
admits the mean. Some automatically include baseness. Among 
these are spite, shamelessness, envy, adultery, theft, and 
murder. These actions and emotions are called by these names 
because they, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base. 
Therefore, in doing these things, one can never be correct but 
must be invariably in error.  
Aristotle says that whereas the virtue of thinking needs 
teaching, experience and time, virtue of character comes about 
as a consequence of following the right habits. The potential to 
be virtuous is in humans by nature, but whether virtues come to 
be present or not is not determined by nature. Consider how one 
learns any craft. One becomes a builder by repeatedly building, 
and one becomes a harpist by repeatedly playing the harp. 
Similarly, one becomes just by doing just actions, temperate by 
doing temperate actions, or brave by doing brave actions.  
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Aristotle gives three rules of conduct to achieve virtue or 
the mean. The first rule of conduct is to choose the lesser of 
two evils by keeping away from that extreme which is more 
contrary to the mean. He writes, 
 
So the person who is aiming at the mean must steer 
away from the extreme that is in greater opposition to 
it, as Calypso advised: ‘Beyond this spray and swell 
keep your ship outside.’ For one of the extremes is a 
greater missing of the mark, the other less so; and 
since hitting the mean is extremely hard, we must take 
the next best course, as they say, and choose the 
lesser of two evils.(1109a34-1109b1) 
 
The second is to be aware of one’s own weaknesses, and to drag 
oneself in the contrary direction; for one arrives at the mean 
by pressing well away from his or her failing. He writes, 
 
But we must also consider the things toward which we 
as individuals are particularly prone. For we each 
have different natural tendencies, and we can find out 
what they are by the pain and pleasures that occur in 
us. And we should drag ourselves in the opposite 
direction, because we shall arrive at the mean by 
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holding far off from where we would miss the mark, 
just as people do when straightening warped pieces of 
wood.(1109b3-8) 
 
Finally, Aristotle advises, one must guard especially against 
pleasure and pleasant things because if one relieves oneself of 
the attraction, one shall be less likely to go wrong. He writes, 
 
In everything, we should be on our guard especially 
against the pleasant — pleasures, that is, - because 
we are not impartial judges of it. So we should adopt 
the same attitude to it as the elders did towards 
Helen, and utter their words in everything we do; for 
by dismissing pleasure in this way, we shall miss the 
mark to a lesser degree. (1109b9-13) 
 
Aristotle says, however, that despite these rules of conduct, it 
is very difficult to hit the mean between two vices. Acting well, 
he notes, is a rare achievement. He writes,  
  
This is why it is hard to be good, because in each 
case it is hard to find the middle point; for instance, 
not everyone can find the center of a circle, but only 
the person with knowledge. So too anyone can get angry, 
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or give and spend money — these are easy; but doing 
them in relation to the right person, in the right 
amount, at the right time, and with the right aim in 
view, and in the right way — this is not something 
anyone can do, nor is it easy. This is why excellence 
in these things is rare, praiseworthy, and noble. 
(1109a25-33) 
 
Aristotle also acknowledges that there is no accurate and 
precise guidance for a right action and that a moral agent must 
rely on his or her perception to determine what to do:  
 
But the person who is blamed is not the one who 
deviates a little, either in excess or deficiency, 
from the right degree, but the one who deviates rather 
more, because he does not escape our notice. But how 
far and to what extent someone must deviate before 
becoming blameworthy it is not easy to determine by 
reason, because nothing perceived by our senses is 
easily determined; such things are particulars, and 
judgement about them lies in perception. (1109b19-26)  
 
Aristotle says that achieving the mean is a difficult task 
and a moral agent can easily stray away from the mean. He also 
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says that a moral agent’s judgment of the mean depends on his or 
her perception in a particular case. The difficulties associated 
with achieving the mean suggest that Aristotle’s views are 
consistent with the existence of moral dilemmas. If a moral 
agent finds it difficult to act according to a particular 
virtue, then he or she is likely to face difficulties when two 
virtues conflict with each other. With virtue ethics, the 
conflict or dilemma should be described somewhat differently. 
Consider the case of Sartre’s student discussed previously. One 
might say that his virtues include the virtue of patriotism and 
the virtue of filial piety. The virtue of patriotism motivates 
him to join the Free French. The virtue of filial piety 
motivates him to take care of his mother. Because he cannot act 
according to both virtues, he is bound to violate one of them. 
So, two virtues entail incompatible actions.  
One might argue that practical wisdom is what enables a 
moral agent to deal with moral dilemmas. According to Aristotle, 
practical wisdom is an excellent dispositional state of the 
intellectual part of the soul. It is a state that enables its 
possessor to attain truth, and contrasts with overall virtue of 
character, which is a dispositional state of the appetitive part 
of the soul. A practically wise person characteristically 
attains practical truth; that is, he or she gets things right in 
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action in the moral sphere, which Aristotle describes as the 
sphere of what is good or bad for human beings.  
Aristotle makes a distinction between natural virtue and 
real virtue, saying that one cannot have real virtue without 
practical wisdom. According to Aristotle, each person possesses 
the character he or she has by nature, since from birth one is 
just, prone to temperance, courageous, and so on. Yet, one 
expects that what is really good is something different from 
character by nature and that he or she will acquire these 
qualities in another way. For example, both children and animals 
have natural states, but without intellect, they are harmful. A 
strongly built person, if deprived of sight, is apt to stumble 
when he moves around. This is the case with real virtue as well. 
As one acquires intellect, his or her actions are quite 
different, and his or her state, while similar to what it was, 
will be of real virtue. 
Rosalind Hursthouse (2006) argues that practical wisdom 
comes into play when a moral agent attempts to resolve moral 
conflicts. The moral agent sometimes faces a situation in which 
good reasons conflict, recommending different and incompatible 
actions. To those who lack practical wisdom, it is not obvious 
that one of the actions is the right thing to do. Typically, 
those with only natural virtues will make a mistake, whereas a 
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practically wise person knows which is the right thing to do and 
acts accordingly.  
Suppose that the requirements of kindness and honesty 
conflict, giving a moral agent reason to lie as well as to tell 
the hurtful truth. Sometimes, the dilemma may be resolvable when 
he or she realizes that the kindest thing to do would be to tell 
the hurtful truth, and at other times, when he or she realizes 
that it would not be dishonest to remain discreetly or politely 
silent.  
Hursthouse says that those with only natural virtues tend 
to think about what the virtues require and the vices rule out 
in terms of conventional generalizations or paradigms. It is 
only with the experience of exceptions — when an admired figure 
does what appears to be a cowardly action and is widely praised, 
and when the action of a respected person surprises one until 
the person explains why he or she did it — that a moral agent 
recognizes a practically wise person’s more sophisticated 
understanding. 
Hursthouse provides other examples to contrast natural 
virtue and practical wisdom. Suppose that a small child on water 
wings drifts out of his depth into the river current, which 
bears him towards the weir. The onlooker with natural virtue 
immediately flings him-/herself into the water and starts 
swimming after him. The onlooker with practical wisdom 
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immediately starts running along the bank to get well ahead of 
the child before flinging him-/herself into the water. 
Suppose also that two soldiers are woken up by the 
unmistakable sounds of the enemy invading the camp. The one with 
natural virtue grabs his sword and rushes straight out the tent 
towards the fray, while the one with practical wisdom pauses 
just long enough to strap on his helmet and find his shield as 
well.  
Despite the difference in behavior between the one with 
natural virtue and the one with real virtue or practical wisdom, 
Aristotle’s comments make one skeptical that even a practically 
wise person can successfully resolve every moral dilemma. 
According to Aristotle, a person becomes practically wise with 
experience. He writes, 
 
Besides, how one should manage one’s own affairs is 
not clear, and ought to be considered. What I have 
said is supported by the fact that, though the young 
become proficient in geometry and mathematics, and 
wise in matters like that, they do not seem to become 
practically wise. The reason is that practical wisdom 
is concerned also with particular fact, and particular 
facts come to be known from experience; and a young 
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person is not experienced, since experience takes a 
long time to produce. (1142a15-22) 
 
Aristotle’s comments suggest that a person does not acquire 
practical wisdom at definite point, but becomes practically wise 
as he or she gains experience. His comments give the impression 
that a person may not be able to become perfectly practically 
wise. Rather, he or she develops practical wisdom with 
experience and the development may be an on-going process. 
Husthouse’s comments support this point: “Whether he always gets 
things right is thereby an unattainable but necessary standard-
setting ideal, or whether Aristotle thinks he is a rare but not 
unknown phenomenon who gets them right ‘for the most part’ need 
not concern us here” (p. 286). These considerations suggest that 
even a practically wise person may not be able to resolve every 
moral conflict successfully, leaving open the possibility moral 
dilemmas.   
On the other hand, Hursthouse (1999) provides a more 
detailed argument for how virtue ethics specifies right action. 
She responds to critiques that are often made against virtue 
ethics. They are as follows: 
 
If virtue ethics is ‘agent-centered rather than act-
centered’, concerned with ‘What sort of person should I 
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be?’ rather than ‘What sorts of action should I do?’ 
(with ‘Being rather than Doing’), if it concentrates on 
the good or virtuous agent rather than on right action 
and on what anyone, virtuous or not, has an obligation 
to do; how can it be a genuine rival to utilitarianism 
and deontology? Surely ethical theories are supposed to 
tell us about right action, i.e., about what sorts of 
act we should do. Utilitarianism and deontology 
certainly do that; if virtue ethics does not, it cannot 
be a genuine rival to them. (p.26) 
 
Hursthouse responds to these critiques by explaining how 
virtue ethics provides action-guidance. She compares virtue 
ethics’ action-guidance with the action-guidance given by act-
utilitarianism and deontology. Act-utilitarianism lays out its 
account of right action as follows: 
 
U1. An action is right iff it promotes the best 
consequences. 
 
This statement provides a specification of right action by 
connecting the concepts of right action with best consequences. 
Yet the statement gives no guidance about how to act unless one 
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knows what the best consequences are. So the best consequences 
must be specified, and this might read: 
 
U2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is 
maximized. 
 
This statement links the concepts of best consequences and 
happiness. Thus, according to this version of act-utilitarianism, 
the right action is the one maximizing happiness.  
One can illustrate how deontology specifies right action in 
a similar way. One begins with a statement linking the concept 
of right action and the concept of a correct moral rule or 
principle: 
 
D1. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a 
correct moral rule or principle. 
 
This statement, however, gives no guidance about how to act 
unless one knows what a correct rule or principle is. So the 
correct rule or principle must be specified in another statement: 
 
D2. A correct moral rule (or principle) is one that . . .  
 
This statement may be completed in different ways, for example: 
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(i) is on the following list (and then a list does follow) 
(ii) is laid on us by God 
(iii) is universalizable  
(iv) would be the object of choice of all rational beings 
 
In a similar way, Hursthouse provides a statement laying 
out virtue ethic’s account of right action: 
 
V1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent 
would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in 
the circumstances. 
 
This statement connects the concept of right action with a 
virtuous agent. This statement, however, may provoke an 
objection that it does not say who the virtuous agents are. 
 Hursthouse says that if the statement provokes an objection 
because it provides no practical guidance, a similar objection 
should be directed at the first statements of act-utilitarianism 
and deontology. Act-utilitarianism must specify what are to 
count as the best consequences, and deontology must specify what 
is to count as a correct moral rule. Similarly, virtue ethics 
must specify who is to count as a virtuous agent. So far the 
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three theories are all in the same position. The statement 
specifying a virtuous agent is as follows: 
 
V1a. A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, 
one who has and exercises the virtues. 
V2. A virtue is a character trait that . . . 
 
How does one complete V2? It depends on one’s view of virtue 
ethics. If one believes that Hume’s second Enquiry espouses 
virtue ethics, a virtue is a character trait that is useful or 
agreeable to its possessor or to others. If one adopts 
Aristotelian ethics, a virtue is a character trait a human being 
needs to flourish or live well.  
 Hursthouse says that the structure of specification of 
right action according to virtue ethics thus closely resembles 
those of act-utilitarianism and many simple forms of deontology. 
Comparing the three, one might say that virtue ethics is agent-
centered rather than consequences- or rules-centered. It is 
agent-centered in that it introduces the concept of the virtuous 
agent in the first statement of its account of right action, 
where act-utilitarianism and deontology introduce the concepts 
of consequences and moral rules, respectively. Virtue ethics 
does, however, provide an answer to what a moral agent ought to 
do. 
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 One might object that Hursthouse has not provided a 
satisfying account of right action according to virtue ethics. 
Deontology yields a set of clear prescriptions which are readily 
applicable. For example, deontological prescriptions such as “Do 
not lie,” “Do not steal,” “Do not inflict evil or harm to 
others,” and “Do keep promises” are relatively easy to 
understand and apply. Yet this is not the case with virtue 
ethics. Virtue ethics’ prescription is somewhat vague: “Do what 
the virtuous agent — who is honest, charitable, and just, etc. — 
would do in these circumstances.” This prescription is not 
useful unless one is a virtuous agent. If one is less than fully 
virtuous, one does not have a clear idea of what a virtuous 
agent would do and, therefore, cannot readily apply the 
prescription. 
 Hursthouse’s reply is that one can seek advice from 
virtuous people. If one believes that one is far from perfect, 
and one is unsure about what a virtuous agent would do in the 
circumstances, then the obvious next step to do is to try to 
find and ask a virtuous agent. Hursthouse says that seeking 
advice is not a trivial point, for it highlights an important 
aspect of our moral life, which is that one seeks moral guidance 
from people who one thinks are morally better than others.  When 
one is concerned about doing what is right but is unsure what 
the right action is, one seeks people whom one respects and 
 
 
158 
 
admires — people that are kinder, more modest, more just, wiser 
— and asks them what they would do in the circumstances.  
 Moreover, seeking advice from virtuous people is not the 
only step one can take to figure out what to do. A virtuous 
agent has been described as the one who is honest, charitable, 
just, etc. So the virtuous agent characteristically acts 
honestly, charitably, justly, etc., and not dishonestly, 
uncharitably, unjustly, etc. Given an enumeration of the virtues, 
one can have a good idea of what a virtuous agent would do in 
the circumstances despite one’s own imperfection. A virtuous 
person would not lie persistently to acquire an unmerited 
advantage; that would be to act both dishonestly and unjustly.  
A virtuous person would help a naked man by the roadside; he or 
she would act charitably. This way, one can receive guidance as 
to what to do.  
 It is doubtful, however, whether Hursthouse’s account is 
satisfying. Frans Svensson (2010) discusses several objections 
to Hursthouse’s account. The first is that there are 
circumstances that no virtuous agent would get into. Suppose 
that Jones has hurt Smith’s feelings, and that Jones has done so 
in a way that no virtuous agent would have done. Intuitively, 
one might say that in these circumstances, it would be right for 
Jones to apologize to Smith. This response is not valid for 
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Hursthouse though, for no virtuous agent would have done what 
Jones did to Smith in the first place.  
 This objection, however, may not be considered a serious 
one; even a virtuous agent could sometimes act out of character. 
Hursthouse’s account is described in terms of what a virtuous 
agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. She does 
not claim that anything that a virtuous agent would do is deemed 
right even if it goes against his or her overall virtuous 
character. Hence, in response to the first objection, it might 
be said that while a virtuous agent would not characteristically 
hurt another person’s feelings, this might happen.  
 Yet even if a virtuous agent could occasionally act out of 
character, there are limits on what he or she could do. Hurting 
someone’s feelings in the heat of an argument, say, may be among 
the things that a virtuous agent could do without having his or 
her virtue put in question. Consider, however, a more serious 
scenario. Imagine a man who induces two women, A and B, to bear 
his child by promising marriage. The man, however, can only 
marry one of them. These circumstances appear to be the ones 
that no virtuous agent could ever be in: they result from his 
behavior during an extended period of time, disqualifying him 
from being considered virtuous.  
 The second objection is that Hursthouse’s account is not 
sensitive to a person’s character flaws. Suppose that John is 
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going away for some weeks to visit his parents. Since he is 
expecting a very important letter, John asks his colleague Peter 
to forward his mail to his parents’ address. Given the 
importance of the letter, if Peter promises to do what John is 
asking of him, John should be able to trust that Peter actually 
fulfills his promise. While a virtuous agent could be trusted to 
keep his or her promise to help John, however, Peter is well 
aware that he cannot be trusted to do this. Peter has a 
character flaw: he has a habit of forgetting what he promises to 
do. Because of this character flaw, Peter would not act rightly 
in promising to help John. On the contrary, he should turn down 
John’s request in order for John to be able to make other 
arrangements. However, a virtuous agent would promise to help 
John in the same circumstances. Thus, Hurthouse’s account does 
not take into consideration a person’s character flaws. 
The final objection is that it is not easy to identify a 
virtuous agent. Louden observes that one does not know with any 
degree of certainty who really is virtuous. How should one go 
about establishing an agent’s true moral character? The standard 
strategy is what might be called the “externalist” one: one 
tries to infer character by observing conduct. Although 
acknowledging the existence of some connection between character 
and conduct, Louden believes that the connection between the two 
is not nearly as tight as externalists assume. The relationship 
 
 
161 
 
is not a necessary one, but is merely contingent. The measure of 
an agent’s character is not exhausted by the values of the 
actions which he or she performs; the most important moral 
traits are what may be called spiritual rather than actional.  
  Svensson thus raises several objections to Husthouse’s view: 
there are circumstances that no virtuous agent would get into, a 
virtuous person may not be a good model to follow for a person 
with character flaws, and it is difficult to identify a virtuous 
person. According to Hursthouse, a moral agent ought to do what 
a virtuous person would characteristically do under the 
circumstances. These objections show the gaps in Hursthouse’s 
view: a moral agent may not able to figure out what to do even 
if he or she tries to do what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do. These objections also apply to situations 
where two virtues conflict with each other. The situations where 
a moral agent cannot figure out what to do are likely to include 
those where two virtues direct him or her to perform 
incompatible actions. Virtue ethics thus appears to leave room 
for the existence of moral dilemmas. 
  Hursthouse (2003) expresses her own views about moral 
dilemmas. She says that the proponents of virtue ethics can 
adopt one of two strategies to deal with moral dilemmas. One 
strategy is to say that many of the moral conflicts that a moral 
agent faces are merely apparent, resulting from a misapplication 
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of the virtues. This strategy provides an explanation of why 
sometimes the moral agent does not know the answer of what to do 
despite the fact that there is an answer. Trivially, the 
explanation is that the moral agent lacks moral knowledge of 
what to do in the situation. The lack arises from the absence of 
moral wisdom — from an inadequate grasp of what is involved in 
acting kindly, charitably, justly, and so on. In other words, 
the moral agent does not fully understand how the virtue terms 
are to be correctly applied. As Aristotle says, moral wisdom, 
unlike mathematical knowledge, cannot be acquired merely by 
attending lectures. Moral wisdom is usually not found in a 
person too young to have much life experience. 
  Hursthouse says that the other strategy, to which she is 
more sympathetic, is to admit that moral dilemmas exist. This 
strategy is to say that there are situations where even a fully 
virtuous person does not know how to take a specific action. If 
fact, two fully virtuous people could act differently despite 
being in the same circumstances: a virtuous person would do A, 
and another virtuous agent would do B, and both A and B are 
right.  
  Hursthouse says, however, that one should not take the 
acceptance of moral dilemmas as a counsel of despair or an 
excuse for moral irresponsibility. It does not license coin-
tossing when a moral agent is faced with a putative dilemma, for 
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the moral choices one finds most difficult to make do not come 
to him or her conveniently labelled as “resolvable” or 
“irresolvable.” It will always be necessary to think hard before 
accepting the idea that a particular moral question does not 
have one right answer. 
  The acceptance of moral dilemmas should not be seen as 
conceding to pluralism, either. When two virtuous people are 
faced with a dilemma, and one does A while the other does B, 
they do not have radically different views about what is 
required by a certain virtue. Rather, they have the same moral 
view about everything, up to and including the view that, in 
this particular case, neither is wrong. Each recognizes the 
propriety of the other’s reason for doing what he or she did.  
 
Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 I have argued that moral dilemmas exist and then have drawn 
the implications of their existence on the major moral theories. 
Of the three major moral theories, the existence of moral 
dilemmas appears to favor virtue ethics. 
 The existence of moral dilemmas is inconsistent with Kant’s 
moral theory. Kant explicitly denies that moral dilemmas exist. 
He says that a conflict of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable. For Kant, moral rules are unconditional 
imperatives that declare certain actions either morally 
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necessary or morally impossible. This means that from the point 
of view of practical reason, a moral agent either must or must 
not perform them. Actions that are neither morally necessary nor 
morally impossible are morally permissible. These three 
categories — the necessary, the impossible, and the permissible 
— are exclusive and exhaustive: every action falls into one and 
only one. Hence, it is incoherent to suppose that an action 
could be both necessary and impossible or that two actions could 
both be necessary when doing one prevents doing the other. If a 
moral agent has a duty to perform a certain action, then the 
moral agent cannot also have a duty to perform another action 
incompatible with it. 
  The existence of moral dilemmas, however, is consistent 
with both Mill’s utilitarianism and virtue ethics. They allow 
for a situation where moral principles conflict but do not 
override each other. Yet virtue ethics provides a better account 
of the phenomenon related to moral dilemmas. In particular, 
virtue ethics explains moral residue better than does 
utilitarianism.  
  An utilitarian might explain moral residue in the following 
way. He or she might say that moral principles or rules (i.e., 
the rules with which acts are in conformity), if consistently 
followed by a moral agent, are likely to bring about most 
utilities in the long run. Yet the moral agent sometimes might 
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not follow a moral principle in the hope that he or she might be 
able to maximize utilities in a particular case. If a moral 
agent attempts to do this, however, he or she is prone to make 
mistakes. The moral agent is cognitively limited and cannot 
foresee the exact consequences of each act. A better strategy is 
to follow the moral principles diligently and consistently. 
  From a utilitarian perspective, it is thus desirable for 
the moral agent to respect moral principles rather than to 
regard them as mere practical guidelines of conduct. In this 
respect, moral residue can serve a utilitarian purpose. The 
feeling of guilt or remorse prevents the moral agent from taking 
moral principles lightly, forcing him or her to violate them 
only under exceptional circumstances. Moral residue can help a 
moral agent maximize the utilities in the long run by enabling 
him or her to follow the moral principles consistently.  
  Michael Walzer (1972), however, disagrees with this 
argument. According to him, the feeling of guilt or remorse is 
unlikely to be felt by someone who is convinced only of its 
usefulness. Suppose that a person violates a moral principle for 
utilitarian reasons. Walzer questions whether the person can 
then feel guilt or remorse for the same reasons. Imagine a moral 
philosopher explaining the utilitarian argument to a moral agent 
who actually does feel guilt or remorse after violating a moral 
principle. The moral agent will not accept the utilitarian 
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explanation of his or her feeling guilt or remorse. That is, the 
moral agent would not say that he or she feels guilt or remorse 
so as to maximize utilities. Rather, the moral agent would say 
that he or she experiences moral residue from violating a moral 
principle. In fact, the moral agent who accepts the utilitarian 
account is not likely to feel guilt or remorse. Walzer says that 
the more fully the moral agent accepts the utilitarian account, 
the less likely he or she is to feel guilt or remorse. Walzer’s 
argument shows that the utilitarian account of moral residue is 
unsatisfactory.  
 Virtue ethics, on the other hand, provides a better account 
of moral residue. In Sartre’s student case discussed earlier, 
different emotional responses by the student have been 
considered after he decides to join the Free French instead of 
taking care of his mother. One of the responses goes like this: 
“I have decided to join the Free French for a patriotic reason. 
I think this is the best decision under the circumstances. If I 
leave my mother, she will have to live alone and plunge into 
despair. I do not feel bad about it though, for that is the 
inevitable consequence of my decision. I have made a choice to 
serve my country and I do not have to feel bad about my mother.”  
 Another response by the student goes like this: “I regret 
what will happen to my mother when I leave her to join the Free 
French. She has been deeply saddened by my father’s treason and 
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my brother’s death. My disappearance will intensify her sadness. 
Although I regret leaving her, I have to put this feeling in 
perspective. I regret many things about this world. I regret, 
for example, that many buildings have been destroyed during the 
war, that there are hungry people on the streets, and that some 
people have lost their family members. I feel bad about this 
state of affairs. On the other hand, bad things happen in life. 
The fact that I am leaving my mother is one of many things that 
I regret about life.”  
  Most people, it has been said, would consider these 
responses inappropriate. Given his relationship with his mother 
and the difficulties that she will face, most would expect the 
student to be more emotionally involved with the situation. He 
should experience, they would say, negative emotions about 
leaving his mother alone, and the negative emotions should be 
stronger than mere regrets about the undesirable state of 
affairs that he faces. The student should feel sorry and 
sympathetic about her mother’s situation, and the negative 
emotions that the student experiences should be akin to guilt or 
remorse. 
 The fact that guilt or remorse is the appropriate emotional 
response by the student has to do with the moral character that 
most would expect him to have. A person who exhibits no 
emotional response or feels merely regret about the situation 
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appears morally callous or insensitive. There is something 
morally lacking about a person with this type of response.  
 A person with a virtuous character would be fully aware of 
the effect that his or her action will have on his or her mother. 
He or she would experience strong negative emotions about the 
situation. Furthermore, he or she would take the moral principle 
of filial piety seriously and feel guilt or remorse for 
violating it. The virtue ethics thus can account for moral 
residue in terms of the emotional response that the virtuous 
person exhibits. The kind of emotional response that the moral 
agent shows reveals the type of character that he or she 
possesses. 
  In fact, a moral agent’s behavior before he or she arrives 
at a decision in a moral dilemma shows his or her character as 
well. Simon Blackburn (1996)’s discussion of the decision-making 
process in a quandary is relevant. According to him, one goes 
through the process of “dithering” and then “plumping” before 
making the choice. A quandary is any situation where there are 
multiple alternatives of which a person must adopt only one, but 
he or she is not quite sure which one is the right one. For 
example, he or she may be undecided about which can of beans of 
the same price to buy in the supermarket. Although packaged 
differently, they are of the same manufacture. There seems to no 
additional fact that would provide a reason to settle the matter 
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in favor of one or the other. 
  A quandary is stable when one does not know anything that 
would settle the choice in favor of one alternative, and when no 
practical investigation can reasonably be expected to alter this. 
Whether an investigation is practical will typically depend on 
its cost, as opposed to the likely benefit of discovering an 
objective ranking of the alternatives. There may be no further 
investigation, or its cost may be too great. In either case, the 
quandary is irremediable. One is in a stable quandary in the 
supermarket example because his or her available strategy is 
limited to just looking, and what one sees does not rank the 
alternatives.  
  One’s judgment that a quandary is stable, however, is in 
general defeasible. Because of this defeasibility, a quandary 
typically does not feel stable. It typically feels as if there 
must be one simple investigation, or exercise of the right 
thought or imagination, that will provide the decisive reason 
for one side. This is what one fears, even though this fear may 
be irrational. One’s “dithering” takes the form of running again 
and again at the issue as if some secret ranking will reveal 
itself.  
  Once one’s quandary is stable, he or she must “plump” for 
one alternative. At some point, the reasoning leaves no ranking 
of alternatives. There is thus nothing left to do but plump. 
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There is a point at which the cost of refusing to act is 
overriding, which makes this option worse than plumping.  
  Plumping sounds light-hearted, but plumping can be done 
with a heavy heart. One can plump knowing that the alternative 
one did not plump for may prove to be the right one in time. 
Plumping can be unpleasant because one fears that with hindsight 
one will see that one would have made a better choice.  
  A moral agent goes through a somewhat similar process as he 
or she tries to revolve a moral dilemma. He or she dithers 
before coming to a decision. He or she weighs the strengths of 
conflicting moral principles, investigates whether her or she 
has taken into consideration all the relevant information, 
assesses the impact that his or her decision will have on the 
parties affected, and if possible, seeks advice from someone 
whom he or she thinks is wiser. The moral agent also feels 
emotionally torn between the alternatives and fears that the 
decision that he or she makes may turn out to be the wrong one 
in hindsight.  
  This is the behavior that most would expect to see from a 
moral agent with a virtuous character: a virtuous moral agent 
would sincerely dither before plumping. A moral agent with a 
less admirable character, on the other hand, would not behave 
the same way. He or she would not take too much time to 
investigate the facts surrounding the situation, would not take 
 
 
171 
 
the applicable moral principles seriously, would not care too 
much about the parties affected by his or her decision, and 
would make a decision light-heartedly.  
  A utilitarian moral agent would also dither before coming 
to a decision. Yet the ways in which the utilitarian moral agent 
and virtuous one dither would differ. The utilitarian moral 
agent would regard the dithering process as the “costs” that 
should be taken into consideration in relation to the expected 
benefits. If the utilitarian moral agent believed that the 
relative costs of dithering were too high, he or she would not 
hesitate to cease dithering and plump. It is conceivable that 
the utilitarian moral agent would not dither at all if he or she 
could rely on the similar past decisions to make the present one.  
  The virtuous moral agent, on the other hand, would behave 
differently. He or she would also consider the costs of 
dithering; ignoring such costs would not be practically wise. 
Yet the virtuous moral agent would dither mainly because he or 
she cared about the moral principles involved and the people 
that would be affected by his or her decision. Even if the 
stakes were not too high, the virtuous moral agent would take 
his or her time to carefully examine the relevant information. 
He or she would plump with anxiety for fear that he or she may 
not have made the right decision.  
  Compared with utilitarianism, virtue ethics thus has the 
 
 
172 
 
advantage of providing a better account of not only moral 
residue but also a moral agent’s behavior before he or she 
arrives at a decision in a moral dilemma.  
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